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Problems From Einstein For 
Process Theism 
THE IMPETUS 
Chapter One 
Throughout history, man has struggled to develop an 
accurate concept of God. Believing that the structure and 
composition of the physical universe conveys some truth 
about God's attributes, man has tended to forsake divine 
I 
revelation and modify his theology with each newly 
discovered empirical fact. Mankind perpetually contends 
that "· .these bodies of [scientific] knowledge explain, 
predict, or in other ways support and systematize true 
statements about the world." 1 This phenomenon is clearly 
evident in contemporary western culture as most disciplines 
are judged by their consistency. with knowledge acquired 
through empirical science. Theology is no exception to 
this general trend. 
For many years, the collection of empirical facts and 
theories known as physics has formed our concepts regarding 
physical spacetime relationships and thus, as argued by 
several theologians, our concepts of God. From the 
mid-sevente~nth century to the early twentieth century, the 
theories of Sir Isaac Newton provided a scientific 
basis for concepts of God which are often categorized as 
1Arnold Koslow, "Introduction," 
Order, ed. Arnold Koslow (New York: 
Inc., 1967), p. 3· 
in The Changeless 
G e o_r_g_e-..... B...--r_a_z_,i"'l-.lre-r-, 
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tenets of clnssical theism. However, with the discoveries 
of Albert Einstein, and his subsequent development of the 
theories of relativity, a novel framework for understanding 
the universe has been developed. This added empirical 
knowledge of spacetime relationships has led some 
theologians to abandon the principles of classical theism 
in pursuit of new theological concepts. 
Because, as many may contend, we can only know God 
through the structural relationships of the observable 
universe, many believe a reassessment of theological 
beliefs in light of recent developments in relativity 
physics is mandated to maintain proper consistency with 
empirical evidence. Accepting the challenge, the 
British philosopher and mathematician, Alfred North 
Whitehead has sought to render a metaphysic which is 
contemporary \'Ti th current scientific thought. \vhi tehead 
writes: 
You cannot shelter theology from science, or 
science from theology: nor can you shelter 
either of them from metaphysics or metaphysics 
from either of them.2 
Such an interrelationship has a profound impact on his 
resulting theology. Adopting the metaphysics and 
theological thoughts of Whitehead and Chl':l,rles Hartshorne, 
theologians including John Cobb, Lewis Ford, and David 
Griffin have attempted to reformulate a concept of God they 
2Alfred North Whitehead, "Religion In the Making," in 
Alfred North Whitehead, An Antholo y, ed. F.S.C Northrop and 
Mason W. Gross New York: MacMillian Co., 1953), p. 855· 
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believe maintains better consistency with Einstein's 
theories of relativity physics. 
Assuming Einstein's theories of relativity are correct, 
as most empirical evidence to date shows them to be, the 
issue is whether this latest theological development, known 
as process theism, is consistent with the relativity physics 
of Einstein. The question is: Does process theology, as 
presently espoused, square with the universe of relativity 
physics? This is the question which deserves consideration. 
However, before looking into the particulars of this 
theology, the scientific foundation and impetus for such a 
system must be considered. First, it -is necessary to 
examine the theories of Einstein. 
The Relative Universe 
Albert Einstein first published his special theory of 
relativity in 1 905 and his general theory in 1 916.3 The 
crux of his theories rest upon new insights into the 
concept of observation at a "point of reference." Einstein 
properly recognized that the observer of an event is only 
stationary in his own reference frame. From the perspective 
of the object being observed, however, the observer is 
actually in motion.4 
3victor Lowe, "Whitehead's Philosophical Development," 
in The Pholosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul A. 
Schlipp (New York: Tudor Publishers, 1951 ), p. 34. 
4James A. Coleman, Relativity for the Layman (New York: 
New American Library, 1958), p. 53. 
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Suppose you are on a bridge overlooking a brook. If 
you focus your attention on the flowing water and ignore the 
river banks, which provide a reference frame, it may appear 
that the bridge is moving and the brook is stationary. The 
realization that motion and observation is relative with 
respect to the observer led Einstein to develop his theories 
of relative spacetime relationships. 
To better conceptualize a relative reference frame, it 
may be beneficial to consider oneself an observer separate _ 
from that which generally provides the illusion of a 
stationary point of reference. Imagine being an observer 
away from the earth at some point in deep space. 
B 
30 miles/sec 
130 miles/sec. 
Figure A 
A 
0 miles/sec. 
100 miles/sec. 
You, reference point A, believe you are moving at a velocity 
of 100 miles/sec: and are being overtaken by an object, 
reference point B, that you consider to be moving at 130 
miles/sec. You conclude this because B is closing in 
distance and B is your only point of reference. 
HovJever, the observer at point B concludes himself to 
be moving at only 30 miles/sec. and point A to be 
stationary. Which observer is correct with regard to 
velocity measurement? According to Einsteinian physics, you 
both are correct because measurement of velocities is 
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relative with respect to the reference point of the 
observer. Applying this concept to our understanding of the 
universe, we must realize that we move about the earth, 
which moves about its axis, which moves about the sun, which 
moves about the galaxy, which, in turn, moves about the 
universe. In short, all potential points of observation are 
in motion. Therefore, all measurement is relative with 
respect to all points of reference. 
To further expand the concept of relativity and the 
flow of time, consider another example. 
Aldebaran t2 
Figure B 
If a star in the Orion constellation (point x) were to turn 
super nova at t1 it would take 300 light years for the event 
to be witnessed on Earth (point z) at t3. However, an 
observer orbiting the star Aldebaran would witness the event 
50 years earlier at t2 for it (point y) is only 250 light 
years from Orion (point x). What one would observe here on 
Earth would be an actual event for us in our "present" at 
t3, but what one would also be observing is the 
"history" of the star Orion for the event was in Orion's 
"present" at t1. If an observer orbiting the star Aldebaran 
were to simultaneously relay a message to Earth at the time 
the super nova was observed in Aldebaran's "present," those 
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on Earth will have already experienced the event by the time 
we receive the transmission from Aldebaran. Therefore, that 
which was transmitted as occurring in Aldebaran 1 s present 
will be recorded as happening in Earth's past, although 
Aldebaran experienced the event first. 
It is clear that even the apprehension of an event 
cannot occur simultaneously at all points of reference in 
the universe. Time, thus, becomes a fourth dimension in 
physics establishing the concept of a spacetime continuum.5 
With this added dimension to consider, we must now think of 
events not just occurring in space but as transpiring at a 
specific point in spacetime. 
Relative time flow and the concept of multiple presents 
are central to Einstein's theories. The particular aspects 
of the relativity theory will be subsequently explored, and 
their difficulties for the God of process theism will be 
considered in depth. 
Systems Compared 
For several centuries, the principles of Newton 
dominated our understanding of the physical universe. The 
concepts, confirmed by repeated experiment, so closely 
approximated relationships that actually exist in nature 
that their espousal continued well into the twentieth 
5Alfred North Whitehead, "Religion In the Making," in 
Alfred North Whitehead, An Anthology, ed. F.S.C Northrop and 
Mason W. Gross (New York: MacMillian Co., 1953), p. 855. 
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century. The process thinker, John Cobb, accurately sets 
forth the current state of Newton's principles when he says: 
In the field of science the fundamental 
principles now applied are remote from the 
fundamental principles of the Newtonian scheme. 
Nevertheless, the Newtonian scheme is recognized 
as having a large measure of applicability. 
As long as we focus attention on bodies of some 
magnitude and upon motion of moderate velocity, 
the laws of science developed by Newto.n hold 
true.6 · 
Therefore, when vast distances and extreme velocities are 
considered, or the subatomic relationships of the atom are 
contemplated, the shortcomings of the Newtonian system 
become evident. 
Isaac Newton offered a scheme that was predictable 
where space was "absolute" and time was "uniform" throughout 
the entire universe. Objects were defined by their position 
in absolute space and not by their relationship to one 
another. This concept of absolute space was not an entity 
wh~ch had parts nor a super body but rather something 'in' 
which bodies moved. The concept of absolute space forms the 
foundation of Newton's lmvs for it is this concept on which 
his laws depend. For example, Newton's first law states 
that, "Every body continues in a state of rest or uniform 
motion in a straight line unless it is compelled by force to 
change that state."? If Newton's first law is correct, any 
body not acted upon maintains its velocity. The second law 
6John B. 
(Philadelphia: 
Cobb, A Christian Natural 
Westminster Press, 1976), p. 272. 
Theology 
?solomon Gartenhaus, Physic's Basic Principles (New 
York: Rhinehart and Winston, 1977), p. g2. 
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says that, "If a body of mass M is subject simultaneously 
., and if A is the acceleration 
of the body then, F=MA where F is the net force or the 
vector sum of the individual forces F=f1+f2+f3 .... n8 If 
there is more than one body in existence they will have 
an effect upon the velocity of the other. Therefore, we 
must be able to logically conceive of a universe where there 
is a single physical object in order for the first lavT to 
hold true. However, motion of a solitary object under the 
first law would be meaningless unless it is compared with 
something else. That "something" is not another physical 
object but rather space itself. Therefore, space must be -
the absolute in the Newtonian system for absolute space is 
that which provides an absolute reference frame for objects 
in motion.9 
Because of Newton's concept of absolute space arrd 
corresponding time, he offerea a system where events could 
occur simultaneously throughout the universe. However, 
Einstein adopted a relative reference frame where motion is 
meaningful only when related to other physical objects. 10 
This relative reference frame offered the mind of man a 
universe in constant flux where there is no unified field 
sibid., p. 97. 
9Newton, "The Mathematical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy and the Systems of the World," .=T.:::.h:...:e __ C:....h..:.....a:....n:.::.;g~e=l..::.e.::.s-=.s 
Order, pp. 64-65. 
10Albert Einstein, "On the Electrodynamics of Moving 
Bodies," in The Changeless Order, ed. Arnold Koslow, (New 
York: George Braziller, Inc., 1967), p. 155. 
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of space and time. Events in the relative universe cannot 
be simultaneous, only highly contemporaneous.11 
Newton's concept of an absolute space and time had many 
theological and philosophical ramifications. One of the 
reasons Newton held to a concept of an absolute present, 
space, and matter was because he implicitly postulated God 
as the central Cosmic Observer of all natural events. 12 
There had to be a uniform present for God to be aware of all 
that was transpiring in his universe. Therefore, the 
possibility of multiple time frames could never be seriously 
considered. There had to be one simultaneous present for 
God to be cognizant of, and respond to, all that happens as 
it happens. 
It is said that the resulting cosmology of the 
seventeenth century was a combination of theology, 
philosophy and Newtonian physics.13 Given the classical 
theological concepts upon which Newton built his scientific 
system, space, time, mass and force were assumed to have 
been "ready made." Newton is accused of considering God to 
be a being entirely transcendent. who made the universe a 
complete and finished product. 14 Whitehead finds this 
concept of a static, complete universe to be at odds with 
11rbid., p. 156. 
12Alan Gragg, Charles Hartshorne (Waco: 
1 973) ' p. 1 09. 
Word Books, 
13Laurence F. Wilmot, Whitehead and God (Waterloo, 
Ontario: Wilfred Lavrier University Press, 1979), p. 31. 
14Ibid., p. 32. 
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the flux, change and evolution he believes to be evident in 
Einstein's relative universe. Newton's notion of a 
complete universe left no room for the evolution of 
matter. The concept of a static universe left Whitehead 
with two unacceptable choices regarding the origin and 
nature of the cosmos: Either it is eternal and unchanging 
or it came into being according to the will of Jehovah. 
To Whitehead, both concepts are fallacious in light of 
development in contemporary scienc~.15 
Newton offered a world of tangible matter, forces, and 
accelerations where velocitiee are measured with respect to 
absolute space. Einstein again shook the Newtonian system 
by rendering a universe where acceleration, velocity and 
time are relative with respect to the reference point of the 
obs~rver, where matter varies in size and mass in proportion 
to energy and velocity, and where the speed of light is the 
only absolute. Einstein expresses his unique concept of 
matter when he says: 
Mass and energy are therefore essentially alike; 
they are only different expressions of the same 
thing. The mass of a body is not a constant; it 
varies with the change in its energy. 16 
Unlike Newton, Einstein offered a concept of reality in 
which matter's essence was no longer immutable but could be 
transformed into pure energy and pure energy has the 
potential to become matter. 
15Ibid. 
16Albert Einstein, The Meaning of Relativity (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1959), p. 47. 
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Whitehead contends that such a universe is not 
eternally static but held in the grip of a self-creative 
process. Because o:f Newton's views, he made no provision 
for the evolution o:f matter and many of the concepts of 
relativity physics that should have occurred to him 
naturally remained unthinkable. 17 The process 
author, Laurence Wilmot writes: 
It is one of the fundamental aims of Whitehead's 
philosophical venture to replace this static 
conception with a dynamic interpretation 
portraying the universe as a continuous process 
of self creative activity in which each actual 
entity exercises a measure o:f choice and in turn 
makes its own contribution to the totality which 
is the universe. 18 
According to process thinkers, the concept of Newton's 
static universe developed out of theological dogma. The 
resulting scientifiG concepts were no less dogmatic and 
persisted for more than two centuries. This dogmatism 
prohibited further scientific speculation and advancement. 
Wilmot explains the theology which fostered the static 
Newtonian science when he says: 
Newton's. . doctrine. . proceeds from and in 
turn fosters -the typical deistic concept of God 
as transcendent creator; having introduced God to 
impose movement and order upon the world, Newton 
could find nothing further :for him to do except 
to keep the universe on its orderly path of 
movement. 19 
He also contends that: 
17Wilmot, Whitehead and God, p. 32. 
18rbid. 
19wilmot, Whitehead and God, p. 95· 
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On this view, no explanation can be found from 
examination of the nature of things as to why 
they believe in God the way they do. Any 
interrelationship which they exhibit is simply a 
pattern imposed upon them from without.20 
Thus, according to Wilmot's analysis of the theological 
implications of the Newtonian system, the God of classical 
theism can serve no other role outside of creator. 
It is Whitehead's contention that because the Newtonian 
system is not acceptable, the corresponding theology and 
cosmology is also unacceptable. Whitehead has, therefore, 
shifted his theology ana cosmology to a position that is 
similar to that of Plato. 21 This shift back to Platonic 
concepts is not an adoption of Plato's scientific concepts 
but rather a belief that his theology and cosmology is more 
consistent with Einstein's physics. Plato presents a 
universe in a constant state of flux--a state of perpetual 
becoming. This universe is "moved" by less-than-infinite 
beings thus allowing for individual freedom.22 With 
modifications, both of these concepts are attractive to 
contemporary process thinkers. 
The God of Plato is similar to that postulated by 
Whitehead for Plato's God is more of a divine artificer than 
a divine coercer. This God is not an omnipotent, omniscient 
creator, but, like a human craftsman, works with the 
20rbid. 
21rbid., p. 31. 
22charles Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy (Lincoln 
University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 72. 
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materials at hand. Unlike Newton's God, the God of 
relativity physics does not create the materials out of 
which everything is made but rather works with those 
materials already existing to bring order out of chaos.23 
With the postulation of Einstein's theories, many 
believed God could no longer have the attributes as 
implicitly held under the Newtonian system. No longer could 
God be thought of as presiding over a universal, ahsolu te, 
present. 
flux with 
coordinate 
God must now account for a universe in constant 
no unified field of time 
the perpetual activity 
through which he can 
of all reality. 
Therefore, many theologians have set out to re-think God in 
light of the current developments in relativity physics. 
Philosophical theologian, Alfred North Whitehead, along with 
subseQuent theological thinkers, devised a metaphysical and 
theological system that claimed to have reestablished 
consistency between theology and contemporary science. It 
is to that metaphysical system we now direct our 
attention. 
23IbicL, p. 82. 
Chapter Two 
THE PROCESS SYSTEM 
After the publication of Einstein's theories of 
relativity, many thinkers began to see their ramifications 
in the fields of philosophy and theology. Several believed 
that the concepts of Einstein offered solutions to the 
perceived philosophical inconsistencies inherent in the 
Newtonian system. One such thinker was Alfred North 
Whitehead. 
Whitehead recognized that there was an unresolved 
duality between that which is material and that which is 
immaterial running through the history of philosophy. From 
Plato to Aristotle to Hume to the scientific principles of 
Ne-vrton, this irreconcilable duality persisted. James Sire 
states this problem well when he says: 
. once we have recognized that something is 
there, we have not necessarily recognized what 
that something is. . . . Some people assume that 
the only basic substance that exists is matter. 
For them, everything is ultimately one thing. 
Others agree that everything is ultimately one 
thing, but they assume that that one thing is 
some. . . non-material substance. 1 
Whitehead asks how that which is matter can relate with 
that which is non-matter, and yet if there is no 
relationship it would be to admit the existence of the one 
while denying the existence of the other. Although 
Whitehead recognizes the spheres of the mental and 
1James W. Sire, The Universe Next Door (Downers Grove: 
Inter Varsity Press, 1976), p. 17. 
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physical, he ultimately claims that there is a relational 
unity between the two concepts. Whitehead's ontology 
allows both realms to be real and part of the same reality. 
The Process Principle of Being 
Central to the process metaphysic is Whitehead's 
concept of ontology or "being." The final problem of 
philosophy, says Whitehead, is to conceive a "complete 
fact."2 In other words, the philosophical quest lies in 
finding the nature of the "that" which is a "complete 
existent": The nature of the "fully existing" entity. 
Plato, and others who follow his teachings, believed that 
that '\llhi ch we perceive as a "fully existing entity" is 
actually a shadow of that which actually exists in another 
realm. 3 While Whitehead may concur 1vi th some of Plato's 
theistic concepts, Plato's illusion of actuality is totally 
unacceptable to Whitehead's concept of reality. 
Aristotle, countering the pas it ion of the Platonist, 
says that, "Apart from things which are actual, there is 
nothing in fact or efficacy. "4 Whitehead is in agreement 
with Aristotle's concept of "being" for things that are 
actual are the "that" which exists in the fullest sense of 
existence. For Whitehead, that which exists is only that 
2rvor Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics (London: 
George, Allen, and Unwin, Lt'd., 1958), p. 17. 
3Ibid., p. 21. 
4Ibid., p. 23. 
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which is really actualized from a multiplicity of 
possibilities. 
The fundamental component of that which exists at any 
given time is an "actual occasion (AO)." Although actual 
occasions will be subsequently discussed in greater detail, 
it is necessary to understand that actual occasions 
constitute all that is actual at a given point in spacetime 
along Einstein's continuum. Actual occasions are the most 
fundamental elements upon which all reality exists and all 
else is derivative.5 It is that which is actually existing 
which is the primary concern to metaphysics, for it is the 
actual occasion which exists in the fullest sense. 6 The 
ontological principle thus affirms that some things are 
actual, and that those entities which are actual form the 
ground from which all other entities are derived. 7 The 
reasons for which metaphysics seeks are to be found in 
actual occasions, for it is the nature of the actual 
occasion that provides the answers. 
Each actual occasion is composed of "actual entities 
(AE)." The term "actual" denotes existence in reality, and 
"entity" refers to a person, thing, or idea. Ivor Leclerc, 
a respected commentator on process thought, states that: 
It is of the utmost importance to be clear about 
the full meaning and implications of 
5John Lango, Whitehead's Ontology (Albany: 
University of New York Press, 1972), p. 2. 
6Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, p. 21. 
7Ibid, p. 24. 
State 
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[Whitehead's] ontological principle. 
First, some entities are actual, i.e. fully 
existent entities--or that at least one entity 
is actual; and, second, all actual entities form 
the ground from which all other types of 
existence are derivative and abstracted.ff 
That is to say since all actual entities are all that, in a 
strict sense, "exist" or "are", all other entities exist 
only in a sense derivative (i.e. pure possibilities) from 
the existence of that which is actual. Thus according to 
the ontological principle, "the world is built up of actual 
[entities]", and whatever other things there are are 
derived by abstraction from actual entities.9 According to 
Leclerc, then, everything that "is'' is an actual occasion. 
The rest of reality, says Whitehead, is "silence."10 
By adopting an ontological principle similar to that 
of the Aristotelian school, Whitehead returns to the 
position which characterized philosophy before the 
introduction of Descartes' "subjective basis" for reality. 
Descartes' proposition: "I think; therefore I am," is what 
Whitehead considered to be the foundation for the 
subjective interpretation of reality. According to 
Whitehead, all an individual actual entity can be sure of 
under the Cartesian system is his own subjective 
experience. This trend toward subjectivism is the point at 
which Whitehead claims that modern philosophy errs. The 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid. 
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problem lies in one's inability to "proceed from our 
knowledge of subjective experiencing to external 
existence.n11 Perceptions cannot be entirely of subjective 
origin "belonging only to the mind," for if they did it 
would mean they came out of nowhere.12 However, according 
to Whitehead's ontological principle, this would be 
impossible. Our impressions of sensation cannot be 
produced by the creative powers of the mind, for they must 
be derived from real actual entities. 
If the process ontological principle is correct, then 
there is "something" out there to be known. \vhi tehead 
expresses the concept that the "that" vrhich can be known 
must be actual when he says: 
According to the ontological principle there is 
nothing that floats into the world from nowhere; 
it is a contradiction in terms to assume that 
some explanatory fact can f;Loat into the actual 
world from non-entity. Non-entity is 
nothingness. Every explanatory fact refers to 
the decision and to the efficacy of an actual 
thing. 13 
Leclerc goes on to add that: 
Our perceptions and concepts, our senses and 
ideas, must in any complete analysis be derived 
from actualities, they cannot be subjectively 
generated. If we know anything at all it is of 
the actually existing universe.f4 
For Whitehead, efforts to discover and understand the 
11n)id, p. 26. 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid. 
14Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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"final reasons" for things in Einstein's relative universe 
must begin with the examination of actual occasions. 
Although he respected the accomplishments of Newton, 
Whitehead said: 
[Although] Newton's methodolgy for physics was an 
overwhelming success. .the forces which he 
introduced left nature without meaning or 
value. [for] he left all the factors of the 
system--more particularly mass and stress--in the 
position of detached facts devoid of any reason 
for their compresence. He thus illustrated a 
great philosophic truth, that a dead nature can 
give no reasons. All ultimate reasons are in 
terms of aim at value. A dead nature aims at 
nothing. Thus for Newton, Nature yielded 
no reasons: it could yield no reasons. 15 
Therefore, according to the ontological principle, actual 
occasions themselves must embody the "reasons" philosophy 
seeks. The ideas and concepts with which we are to 
conceive nature, the universe, and God are to be derived 
from the essence of actual occasions. 
For process thought, as set forth by Whitehead, there 
is something that exists that we can know, for the "common 
sense of man conceives that all his not ions ultimately 
refer to actual [occasions J. "16 That which is spirit and 
that which is matter are not two disjunctive spheres but 
are, rather, part of the same reality--the same actual 
occasion. This unique concept of being fostered an equally 
unique corresponding metaphysic. ' 
15Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: 
MacMillan Co., 1958), pp. 183-184. 
16Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, p. 27. 
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The Process Metaphysic 
To properly contrast the theories in question, an 
understanding of the basic tenets of the process metaphysic 
is necessary, for it is this metaphysic which provides the 
modus operandi for the process God. Although process 
thought had its origin in the mind of Alfred North 
Whitehead, its impetus can be traced back to the relativity 
theories of Albert Einstein. Clearly, this physicist and 
his concepts of spacetime had a great impact upon the 
philosophical development of Whitehead.17 The universe 
Einstein offered to the mind of Whitehead was no longer the 
Newtonian scheme of simultaneous, uniform, absolute 
objects, motion, s~ace, and time. Rather, it was a 
universe of motion. in which space and time became one 
continuum, and the physical characteristics of objects in 
motion became relative with respect to the reference point 
of the observer. 18 Whitehead, speaking of the Newtonian 
scheme, says: 
The notion of empty space, the mere vehicle of 
spacial interconnections, has been eliminated 
from recent science. The spacial universe is a 
field of force, or in other words, a field of 
incessant activity ... the unexpected result has 
been the elimination of bits of matter, as 
17victor Lowe, "Whitehead's Philosophical 
Development," in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 
ed. Paul A. Schlipp (New York: Tudor Pub., 1951), pp. 
66-70. 
18Evander Bradley McGil vary, "Space-Time, 
Location, etc." in The Philosophy of Alfred 
Whitehead, ed. Paul A. Schlipp (New York: Tudor 
1951), pp. 221-224. 
Simple 
North 
Pub., 
self-identical 
t . 1 q proper 1es. --
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supports for physical 
This concept of reality greatly alters former concepts of 
matter under the Newtonian system. Bertrand Russell is 
correct when he says: "The world which the theory of 
relativity presents is not so much a world of 'things' as a 
world of 'events. ' It is 'events' that are the stuff of 
relativity physics. n20 This concept of "events" and the 
process by which they become actualized forms the basis for 
process philosophy. The existence of such a universe where 
events are brought into being along the spacetime continuum 
required a new metaphysical framevTOrk and that is exactly 
what Whitehead rendered. 
Just as Einstein saw space and time as inseparable and 
as being one single continuum, so, likewise, did Whitehead. 
As previously mentioned, the heart of Whitehead's concepts 
of reality and spacetime flow is the idea of an actual 
occasion. According to Whitehead, at each point in time 
(tn) reality and all the physical objects that compose it 
are in a unique, specific order and arrangement. Such an 
actualized arrangement of matter in reality at tn is called 
an actual occasion. As time progresses from t1 through 
t1+n there are corresponding compositions of matter in 
reality. At each point along the relative spacetime 
continuum there is a corresponding actual occasion. 
19whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 186. 
20Bertrand Russell, ABC of Relativity (Worthhampton: 
John Dickens and Co., 1958), pp. 134-135· 
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According to Whitehead, it is actual occasions that "stand 
out with a certain extreme finality.n21 
I ~ 
Figure C 
As long as time is progressing, actual occasions will be 
actualizing. When spacetime is viewed as an endless 
continuum, the corresponding actual occasions can be viewed 
as flowing one after the other in never ending succession. 
As previously considered, one important aspect of each 
actual occasion is the actual entity or individua1.22 
Actual entities are actualized and perish with each 
unfolding actual occasion just like their aggregates (i.e. 
other matter in reality at tn such as sticks and stones). 
Because an actual occasion is actualized and perishes in 
such an extremely small increment of time, transition from 
one AO to the next is indiscernible to individual actual 
entities. The fact that transition goes unnoticed renders 
a perception of unbroken reality. The actual entity is 
never fully cognizant of the "present" (i.e. t1 at which 
A01 is actualized) but is aware only through reflection 
upon events that have already transpired. As quickly as 
21Alfred North Whitehead, "Process and Reality," in 
Alfred North Whitehead, An Anthology, ed. F.S.C. Northrop 
and Mason W. Gross (New York: MacMillan Co., 1953), 
p. 589. 
22rbid., p. 585. 
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the present "becomes" it is the past and only then is 
reality suitable for examination through the reflection of 
actual entities. Whitehead comments further on this 
phenomenon when h~ says: 
There is a conventional view of experience, never 
admitted explicitly but persistently lurking in 
the tacit presuppositions. This view conceives 
experience as a clear-cut knowledge of clear-cut 
items with clear-cut connections with each other. 
This is the concept of 'trim, tidy, finite 
experience uniformly illuminated. No notion 
could be further from the truth.23 
He proceeds to say that we, as actual entities, " .are 
not conscious of any clear-cut analysis of complete 
experience.rr24 Therefore, because the amount of time at 
which an actual occasion transpires is so extremely small, 
there is no way for an actual entity to perceive when A01 
ends and A02 begins. The progression of becoming an actual 
entity and proceeding through the point to actuality into 
non-being is indistinguishable.25 
Although the composition of each actual occasion is 
extremely complex, that which composes an actual occasion 
does not come together in a random fashion. Rather, each 
AO is comprised on the basis of a choice between a 
multiplicity of pure possibilities. These "pure 
possibilities" are also called "eternal objects" and are 
l 
not created or destroyed. It is the eternal object (EO) 
that forms the reservoir of possibilities for future actual 
23Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics~ p. 43· 
24Ibid., p. 44. 
25Royce G. Gruenler, The Tnexhausti ble God (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983), pp. 17-18. 
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occasions. John Lango considers the nature of EOs when he 
says: 
Each eternal object in the actual world of an 
actual entity has the potentiality for being 
prehended [brought into the composition of the 
becoming AO]. Whereas, each created actual 
entity is created [comes into being at t1J, each 
eternal object is eternal. Therefore, although 
not all created entities are in the actual world 
of that actual entity [because not all created 
EOs come irito being when the AO comes into 
being], all eternal objects are in the world of 
that and every actual entity [because all eternal 
objects always exist as _possibilities even if 
they are not actualized].26 
The actualization of pure possibilities forms the basis for 
the process metaphysic as time progresses along the 
spacetime continuum. 27 Each eternal object is prehended 
(i.e. considered for· selection in the final actualized 
composition). In contrast, each created entity is 
prehended only by those actual entities in its future. 
Gruenler, discussing Whitehead's concepts of actual entity 
freedom, writes: 
Accordingly, Whitehead rejects the Christian 
concept of the sovereignty of God and avers that 
"the concrescence of each individual AE is 
internally determined and externally free."28 
The indeterminateness of the future afforded by the 
relationship between AOs and EOs is integral to Whitehead's 
metaphysic.29 
26Lango, Whitehead's Ontology, p. 25. 
27rJovle, "vThi tehead' s Philosophical Development," The 
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, p. 104. 
28Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, p. 29. 
29Lango, Whitehead's Ontology, p. 25. 
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The process of possibilities "becoming" actual remains 
in a continuous state of flux. Part of this flux involves 
the movement from one actual occasion at t 1 to the next 
actual occasion at t1+n· This movement is known as 
"transition."30 
Prehension 
concrescence 
past present future 
Figure D 
As the actual occasion progresses in transition, data is 
selected for the composition of present actual occasions 
from a myriad of possibilities nrovided by eternal objects. 
The action of selecting the composition of a present actual 
occasion is called positive "prehension" or "~eeling" and 
involves determining which EOs will be actualized. 
Regarding prehension, John Lango writes: 
.each entity has the potentiality for being 
prehended by or ingressing into an actual entity; 
each entity has the potentiality for being an 
element in the internal process of concrescence 
[i.e. actualization] of an actual entity but some 
entities are excluded from concrescence.31 
Thus, with the becoming of each actual occasion, a certain 
portion of data available for actualization is excluded 
from the final composition of the actual occasion. This 
30Laurance F. Wilmot, Whitehead and God, (Waterloo, 
Ontario: Wilfred Lavrier University Press, 1979), p. 26. 
31Lango, Whitehead's Ontology, p. 23. 
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exclusion of data is known as negative prehension.32 Lango 
goes on to say: 
If an entity has the potentiality for being 
prehended by an actual entity, it must either be 
included as an element in the concrescence of 
that actual entity by being prehended positively 
or be excluded from that concrescence by being 
prehended negatively; it cannot be neglected. 
Therefore, whether prehended pDsitively or 
negatively, the entity is always relevant to the 
actual entity.33 
It is this relationship between positive and negative 
prehension that ultimately determines what the composition 
of reality will be. 
Once data has moved from positive pre hens ion to a 
state of final actualization, "concrescence" 
transpired. 34 Whitehead comments on the process 
actualization when he says: 
The word concrescence is a derivative from the 
familiar Latin verb, meaning 'growing 
together' . . the principle 'concrete' is 
familiarly used for the notion of complete 
physical reality. Thus concrescence is useful to 
convey the notion of many things acquiring 
complete complex unity.35 
has 
of 
There are three phases involved in forming this 
complex unity. The initial phase involves the prehension 
or physical feelings acquired from transition. Thus: "An 
32Lowe, "Whitehead's Philosophical Development," 
P· 42. 
33Lango, Whitehead's Ontology, p. 23. 
34Ibid., p. 22. 
35 Alfred North Whitehead, "Advantures in Ideas," in 
Alfred North Whitehead, An Anthology, ed. F.S.C. Northrop 
and 8 :J!ason vi. Gross (New York: MacMillan Co., 1953), P· ??· 
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actual entity 'conforms' to [i.e. is the effect of] th.e 
.. 
actual entities in its actual world through its initial 
phase of physical feeling.n36 
The next phase is the supplementary phase. At this 
stage complete ingression takes place and the actual entity 
makes its own "valuation" (i.e. choice) as to its final 
form. In the initial phase the actual entity conforms, but 
in the supplemental stage it begins its own "aim." This 
process of valuation allows actual entities to remain only 
partially determined.37 
The final phase is full being. The actual entity 
exists and possesses a complete unity of feeling.38 
Clearly, the term concrescence denotes the actual occasion 
in between the point at which it is "becoming" and the. 
point at which it "is no more." 
Obviously, the metaphysical developments of Alfred 
North Whitehead drastically alter the Newtonian concepts of 
reality. Again, according to Russell: "Matter is to be 
conceived as strings of connected events like the 
successive notes. of a song."39 That which gives the 
illusion of continuity of content present in subsequent 
actual occasions is the likeness of A02 to the preceding 
A02-n· Matter then exists because of the similarity of the 
36Lango, Whitehead's Ontology, p. 35· 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid. 
39Russell, ABC of Relativity, p. 135· 
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present actual occasion to previous events. Having 
provided a basic understanding of the process metaphysic 
and the "events" which compose it, the next section 
considers the resulting theological developments. 
The God of Process Thought 
For a time, Whitehead himself worked on developing a 
theology corresponding to his metaphysic. His original 
concepts have been adopted and expanded by other 
theologians such as John Cobb, Lewis Ford, David Griffin 
and Charles Hartshorne. The theologies of these men will 
be further explored in this paper. 
According to process theism as developed by these 
theologians, God is thought to be a dipolar being. One 
pole is the mental pole and the other is the physical. 
This recognition of two divine poles is not an 
acknowledgment of the philosophical duality between mind 
and matter but rather an attempt to combine the material 
and the immaterial into a unified reality. I1et us first 
seek to consider these poles individually and then view 
them in combination to better understand their 
interdependence. 
When we are speaking of the physical pole of the God 
of Whitehead's process theism we are talking about the 
sphere of reality in which actual occasions (i.e. all 
physical reality) becomes actualized or achieve full being. 
Gruenler says of Whitehead's position: 
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God in his own actuality is consequent upon and 
derivative from their [actual entity] creativity. 
Creaturely freedom is indispensable to God's own 
concrete existence. God iD his consequent or 
concrescent nature is contingent.40 
This aspect of God is known as the "consequent" nature and 
involves all facets of concrescence.41 John Cobb speaks of 
this nature when he says: 
The consequent nature of God is God's physical 
pole, his prehension of the actual occasion 
constituting the temporal world. Since these 
occasions came to be successively, there is 
successiveness in the divine nature that suggests 
temporality. However, the perpetual perishing 
that constitutes the temporality of the world is 
absent in God. Hence, God in his consequent 
nature is called everlasting.42 
Therefore, some aspect of every actual occasion is 
everlastingly retained in God. 43 Once an actual occasion 
has transpired, the data from that AO remains an eternal 
object in the mind of God thus remaining potential data for 
future actualities. The physical pole of God may then be 
thought of as the reception and actualization of data (i.e. 
pure possibilities) from the mind of .God. This 
actualization of data is, in effect, all of physical 
reality making the material universe the body of God. God, 
therefore, always remains eminent "in" the world for, as 
\vhi tehead says, "God is 'in' the world, creating 
40Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, p. 29. 
41Lewis S. Ford, The Lure of God, (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1978), pp. 83, 105. 
42John B. 
(Philadelphia: 
Cobb, A Christian Natural 
Westminster Press, 1974), p. 161. 
43Ibid., pp. 178-187. 
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continually in us and around us, or is nowhere."44 
Clearly, we must realize that "that" which is not actual 
does not exist, unless it is a possibility, and all that is 
actual is God's physical pole. 
While it is correct to say that God is "in" the world, 
God is not exclusively the physical universe for he has a 
mental pole containing pure pos~ibilities. This concept of 
God allows process theism to be properly termed a form of 
panentheism. Although God is all that is actualized he is 
thought to be more than mere physical "stuff." Just as we 
are thought to have both body and mind, so God also is 
composed of both physical and mental poles making him a 
dipolar deity. It is to the proc~ss concept of God's mind 
that we now direct our thoughts. 
Although consciousness and thought may be associated 
with mentality, in process theology they do not necessarily 
have to be. When we speak of mentality in process thought 
we are speaking of a self -determined response to data. 45 
In considering the concept of God's mentality, John Cobb 
writes: 
Eternal objects are not actual entities like the 
occasions of experience. They are pure 
possibilities for realization of some limited 
number of such possibilities. . A conceptual 
prehension is a prehension of an eternal object 
as such. tTust as physical prehensions comprise 
the physical pole of each actual occasion of 
44Lucien Price, Dialogues of Alfred North \'lhi tehead 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1954), p. 370. 
45cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 33-34-
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experience, so conceptual prehensions constitute 
the mental pole.46 
Therefore, all pure possibiiities available for 
actualization are contained in the minc1 of God. God not 
only stores these eternal objects in his mind, he also 
coordinates their order as he attempts to direct the 
composition of becoming AOs. Again, Cobb comments on God's 
mental activity when he says: 
.it is clear that God functions as a 
principle of limitation by ordering the eternal 
objects. If these existed simply as an 
indifferent multiplicity, there would be no basis 
for selection, hence no limits, no definiteness, 
no order. God provides limits by ordering this 
indefinite multiplicity.47 
The mind of God plots the course of the evolutionary 
advance of the universe by providing each actual occasion 
with possibilities and therefore reacts 
self-determinatively to each AO. God is, thus, eminent in 
that he is "in" the world via his consequent nature but ia 
transcendent in that his mind or "primordial nature" acts 
as a storehouse for non-temporal possibilities. This 
mental pole is known as the "primordial" nature and is 
responsible for coordinating, at least on some limited 
scale, the evolutionary advance of the universe. 
Given the metaphysic that the process God must operate 
under, it is understandable that his attributes should be 
somewhat different 
46rbid., p. 155. 
47Ibid., p. 34· 
than those ascribed to the God of 
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classical theism. One such difference involves God's 
omniscience. The process theologian, unlike his classical 
counterpart, holds that God knows all that he can know.48 
However, this knowledge does not include the future for the 
future is not something there is to know. According to 
Lewis Ford: 
Whitehead argues that God does know everything 
that there is to know, but he challenges that the 
future can be known as if it were already actual. 
To know the future in concrete detail which it 
will become is to know what is possible as if it 
were actual. This is a contradiction.49 
Charles Hartshorne comments on God's knowledge of that 
which has already transpired when he writes: 
Is there a past for God? It is said that God's 
occasions never 'perish' and that there is no 
order of succession in the divine life, which is 
most expressly stated to be 'fluent.' It is 
indeed not the case that succession depends 
essentially upon perishing, upon fading of 
immediacy as events cease to ,be present events.50 
God, then, knows only that which is presently happening 
(i.e. all actual occasions) and all that which has or may 
potentially happen (i.e. pure possibilities). 
Another divine attribute that diverges from the norms 
of classical thought is the process concept of omnipotence. 
The process notion of divine omnipotence involves God's 
ability to do anything necessary to "lure" his will into 
actuality. 51 David Griffin puts it well when he says: 
48Ford, The Lure of God, p. 11. 
49Ibid. 
50charles Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 84. 
51 Ford, The Lure of God, pp. 19-20, 23. 
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"God's power is persuasive, not con trolling." 52 Process 
omnipotence does not include a divine ability to coerce. 
God does not compel any actual en~ity to follow his divine 
"initial aim." God only provides the lures or pure 
possibilities on which the actual entity may act. 
Each actual occasion begins by prehending the "divine 
urge" or lure for the realization of God's initial aim 
(i.e. that which will accomplish God's purpose and 
actualize the greatest possible good).53 The actual entity 
has the ability to exercise freedom by positively or 
negatively prehending the initial aims of God. lvhat is 
actualized is the "subjective aim" of the individual as the 
actual entity responds self-determinatively to the 
possibilities provided by God's initial aim. However, 
individual actual entities often negatively prehend much of 
God's initial aim, but the closer the two aims are in 
relation to that which is desired by God and that which is 
positively prehended by the AE, the greater the good that 
will result. Because man is a free willing entity of which 
God can only lure, never coerce, man has the ability to 
accept the lure of God or reject it.54 Process theism thus 
accounts for evil by contending its origin to be the 
self-determined response of the actual entity and not a 
52navid Ray Griffin, God, Power and Evil: A Process 
Theodicy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), p. 276. 
53Ibid., p. 227. 
54Ford, The Lure of God, p. 21. 
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a product of God's divine initial aim. Under process 
theism, the omniscient, omnipotent God must consider the 
myriad of man's possible reactions to his divine initial 
aim, although he will never know how man will behave before 
he does so, as each occasion actualizes itself. 
Like the God of classical theism, the God of process 
theology is also conceptualized as "Creator." John Cobb 
says: 
In Whitehead's analysis, God's role in creation 
centers in the provision to each actual occasion 
of its initial aim. This role is of such 
importance that Whitehead on occasion 
acknowledges that God may be conceived in his 
philosophy as the creator of all temporal 
entities. Yet, more frequently he opposes the 
various connotations of the term creator as 
applied to God, and prefers to speak of God and 
the temporal world as jointly qualifying or 
conditioning creativity, which then seems to play 
the ultimate role in creation.55 
He goes on to say that: 
... the initial aim is the aim that is ideal for 
that occasion given its situation. It is not 
God's ideal for that situation in some abstract 
sense. It is the adaptation of God's purposes to 
the actual world. . . . The initial aim does not 
determine the outcome, although it profoundly 
influences [what is actualized l· . in 
subsequent phases the occasion adjusts its aim 
and makes its own decision as to the outcome it 
will elicit from the situation given to it.56 
Therefore, he concludes: 
The contribution of an 
aim is not simply one 
important contributions 
occasion to its initial 
among several equally 
to its actuality in 
55cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 203-204. 
56Ibid., p. 205. 
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nature. The initial aim is in reality the 
initiating principle in the occasion.57 
Although God does not create the eternal objects which 
provide possibilities for each actual occasion, he does 
order them and provides the best possible lure for 
actualization. In this sense God is the Creator for 
without possibilities to actualize the occasion could not 
"become." God, then, creates by supplying the data which 
once prehended, provide the content for that which is 
ultimately actualized. 
This principle of creativity is central to Whitehead's 
thought, for with creat i vi. ty comes "novelty." Whitehead 
says: 
Creativity is the universal of universals 
characterizing ultimate matter of fact. It is 
this ultimate principle by which the many which 
are the universe disjunctively, become the one 
actual occasion, which is the universe 
conjunctively. It lies in the nature of 
things that the many enter into a complex 
unity.58 
As the "many become one" through creativity, novel events 
occur. Whitehead recognized that all reality has two 
poles, one mental and the other physical. Every actual 
occasion prehends past occasions or pure possib~lities thus 
providing novelty to that which is created for there is 
always the possibility that the AO will embody some quality 
not received from its past world.59 Creativity is the 
57Il)id., p. 204. 
58whitehead, "Process and Reality," p. 588. 
59rbid. 
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principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity 
diverse from any entity in the many which are unified. 
Thus, creativity introduces novelty into the content of the 
"many" which comprise the universe disjunctively. The 
"creative advance" of process theism is the application of 
the ultimate principle of creativity to each novel 
situation which it originates.60 Novelty, then, is an 
essential factor in God's creative activity of Einstein's 
relative universe. 
60Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, PP· 203-214. 
Chapter Three 
GOD AND THE RELATIVE UNIVERSE 
After considering the concepts of Whitehead and 
subsequent theological thinkers, one recognizes that actual 
occasions are the process ground of reality--the "really 
real." These occasions are brought into being after data, 
provided by pure possibilities from the mind of Goo, are 
pr·ehended. This data supplied ·by God's mental pole is 
actualized in his physical pole, the universe. 
All actual occasions bear a resemblance to their 
preceding AO as event after event is actualized along the 
space time continuum. However, this resemblance is lost as 
AOs exercise their freedom and negatively prehend the will 
of God. God, then, is thought to act as a planner of the 
universal creative advance by providing possible lures for 
actualization. Although this God vras postulated after the 
acceptance of Einstein's relativity theories, the question 
still remains: Can such a God function, as presently 
conceived, in the relative universe? It is to this issue 
we now focus our consideration. 
The Ramifications of Relative Time 
Perhaps the most important scientific contribution to 
our understanding of the universe was the proper 
incorporation of time into our physics. Unlike the 
conceptual framework of the Newtonian system, Einsteinian 
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physics does not hol8 time to be progressing at a constant 
uniform rate for each point in the universe. 
The flow of time, and thus sim11l tanei ty under the 
Einsteinian system, varies with both poRi tion (i.e. point 
of reference) and velocity. Establishing the proper time 
flow for two objects moving relative to one another. is 
determined by the following equation: 
Equation 1 
Again, an example may be helpful to aid in our 
understanding of relative time flow. 
161,000 miles/sec. 0 miles/sec. 
A--------------------~ -.-------------------B 0 miles/sec. 161,000 miles/sec. 
Figure E 
If objects A and B have a relative velocity of 161 ,000 
miles/sec., Equation 2 would indicate that B's passage of 
time would appear to A to be progressing only half as fast 
as B perceives. The higher the relative velocity, the 
slower the appearance of B's time passage to A. The 
special theory of relativity shows the spacetime continuum 
flowing at a non-uniform rate for A and B. Time flows, or 
passes thrcmghont the universe, at different rates for two 
points of reference moving relative to each other. This 
phenomenon is known as "time dilation."1 
1Franklin l\Hller Jr., College Physics, 4th ed. (Ue\v 
York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1977, p. 155· 
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It is clear, then, that with the develo-pment of the 
theory of relativity came a new concept of the flo\<r of 
time. No longer can time be considered one universally 
advancing flow but is now to be looked upon as progressing 
at different rates relative to the reference point of the 
observer. This concept of a spacetime continuum causes 
some rather significant problems for the process thinker. 
It is to those problems we now turn our attention. 
The Continuum and Duration in Time 
A problem concerning God, time, and their relationship 
involves the use of the concept of an "increment of time" 
when analyzing the process. William James, a philosopher 
who shared Whitehead's account of a "field of perception,"2 
expounds upon the topic of our comprehension of time 
passage when he says: 
Let anyone try, I will not say to arrest, but to 
notice or attend to, the "present" moment of 
time. One of the most baffling experiences 
occurs. Where is it, this "present?" It has 
melted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, 
gone in the instant of becoming.3 
Therefore, we may know the "present" only as we reflect on 
it as the immediate past. Whitehead further reflects this 
concept as he states that: 
2vi ctor Lowe, "vlhi tehead 's Philosophical Development," 
in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul A. 
Schlipp (New York: Tudor Pub., 1951 ), p. 64. 
3william James, Psychology (Cleveland: Fine Editions 
Press, 1948), p. 280. 
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In every act of becoming there is the becoming of 
something vi th temporal extension; but the act 
itself is not extensive, in the f1ense that it is 
divisible into earlier and later acts of becoming 
which correspond to the extensive divisibility of 
what has become.4 
In discussing the concrescence of events, Whitehead writes: 
Events become and perish. In their becoming they 
are immediate and then vanish into the past. 
They are gone; they have perished; they are no 
more and have passed into non-being.5 
Although vlhi tehead views reality as an unbroken chain of 
events, there must be "points in time" at which these 
events become actual. Clearly, there is a period when an 
event is prehending possibilities for actualization and is 
said to he becoming, and a period uhen it passes out of 
actuality. However, there must a] so be a period \vhen an 
event "is." There must be an increment of time, although 
extremely short, between an event's becoming and just prior 
to its non-being. John Cobb and David Griffin acknowledge 
this point at which things are "actual" when they speak of 
the "moment of concrescence (i.e. t1 at which 
actualized). n6 Cob1) goes on to write that: 
From the poj_nt of view of physical time 
actual occasions are temporally atomic. ';1his 
4Ivor Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics 
George, Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1958), p. 77. 
A01 is 
the 
is 
(London: 
5 Al:;:'rerl north Hhi tehead, "Process and Rea1i ty," in 
Alfred North Whitehead, An Anthology, ed. F.S.C. Northrop 
and Mason W. Gross (New York: MacMil1an Co., 1953), 
P· 855· 
6John 13. Col1b, and David Ray Griffin, ProcesD 
ThPo1ogy: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1g76), pp. 67, 73, 164. 
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they are indivisible into earlier and later 
portions 1 bnt they are not 1 ike poi ntf3, 
indivisible because unextended. Each point has 
temporal ext ens ion. . . . 7 
This position seems to concur with Whitehead's concept of 
an events' actualization in time for he says: 
Temporal process, then, is a discrete succession 
of epochs, or arrests, each being the duration 
required for the erne rgence of a pervasive unity 
of a single fact.8 
Therefore, when process thinkers speak of an actual 
occasion they are thinking about its actualization at an 
extremely small duration in time. Lewis Ford states that 
ocbasions transpire at a finitely small point in spacetime 
and are "conceptually nivisible but undivided. n9 \:lhat he 
appears to be saying is that you can conceptually divide an 
increment of time at which a compl~te AO occurs but you are 
left with two shorter increments of time and those 
increments, then, contain two complete actual occasions. 
This conceptual division can be done ad infinitum and what 
you are left with is AOs actualizing at smaller and smaller 
increments of spacetime. This conceptual division 
ultimately renders these increments, necessary for the 
actualization of AOs, infinitely small. However, if the 
increments of time at which AOs occur are infinitely small 
7crolm B. 
("Philadelphia: 
Col1l>, A Christian Natural Theology 
Westminster Press, 1974), pp. 185-186. 
Bvictor I,owe, Unrlerstanding \llbitehc::ao 
Johns llopkins Press, 1968), p. 229. 
(Baltimore: 
3J,e\liE3 f.. Po rd , A personal lP- tt e r regarding JH'ocef; fi 
theism and relativity physics, 1 December 1983. 
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we can have an unbroken continuum of spacetime but no 
actual "durations" at which events can be actualized. If, 
on the other hand, there are finite points of time dur~tion 
at which reality is actualized, other problems develop for 
process thought. 
In process theology, at each point along the spacetime 
continuum, there is a corresponding actualized arrangement 
of matter in existence. This arrangement locks space and 
time into a unity. As long as time is progressing there is 
to be an inseparable corresponding actualized arrangement 
of matter in reality. 10 However, if one insists that 
spacetime is a flowing continuum then there is no "point in 
time" for events to become actualized no matter hmv- small 
the duration of time is theorized to be. If there actually 
is an infinitely small point in time at which actual 
occasions achieve being, the question then becomes: Does 
an AO really exist along the spacetime continuum at tn? 
One may contend that the concept of an "increment of time"' 
is merely an intellectual construct that helps explain the 
flow of spacetime and the actualization of reality. It 
appears, however, that at least Cobb, Ford, and Whitehead 
are postulating an actual duration in time where events are 
actualized. 
Clearly, the "Einsteinian concept of spacetime flo"i'r is 
one of a smooth, unbroken continuum (see Figure F1) for 
Einstein writes: 
10Lowe, Understanding Whitehead, p. 25. 
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The experience of an individual appears to us 
arranged in a series of events; in this series 
the single events which we remember appear to be 
ordered according to the criterion of "earlier" 
and "later", which cannot be analyzed further. 
There exists, therefore, for the individual, an 
I-time, or subjective time. This in itself is 
not measurable.11 
Einstein, then, believed time to be an unbroken continuum 
where the "subjective present" (i.e. , in :process thought, 
the point at which reality is actualized) has no ouration 
for it "is not measurable." This Einsteinian position 
would seem to indicate that there is no disjunctive "point 
in time" at which actual occasions achieve full being. The 
problem for process thought is that if a point in time 
where an AO takes place does exist, then time is not the 
smooth, unbroken, flm·r relativity physics claims it to be 
(see Figure F1 ). 
Figure F1 
A02 A03 
~--------~1 J~--------~1 ~~~~~ 
t2 t3 
Figure F2 
If the point in time where actual occasions occur is 
infinitely small, then they are not true durations and such 
11Albert Einstein, The Meaning of Relativity 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 1. 
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"points" cannot be distinguishec_ from other points in time 
along the continuum vrhere AOs occur. Such a view would 
allow spacetime to be viewed as an unbroken continuum but 
individual, distinguishable, actual occasions do not exist. 
Hmvever, if "moments of concrescence" exist as finite 
durations (see Figure F2) in time at \vhich AOs actualize 
themselves, then . process the~logians can speak of 
specific actual occasions which compose reality at tn but 
cannot speak of an unbroken flow of spacetime as required 
by relativity physics. 
Lewis Ford responds to this criticism by saying: 
The extensive continuum (EC) is continuous but 
potential, whereas the actuality of becoming 
which atomizes the continuum is Cliscontinuous. 
[There is] no difficulty if we recognize the 
difference between the potential and the 
actual. 1 2 
Hm•rever, to acknowledge that the continuum is "atomized," 
or to treat it as made up of many diverse unities of actual 
occasions, is to acknowledge that process thought considers 
the spacetime continuum to be a series of "punctuations." 
If that which is actualized, or necessary for a given 
concept of actualizRt:i.on (i.e. a duration in time) serves 
to punctuate the continuum, then, in reality, one has no 
continuum at all--merely a chain of punctpations. A 
distinction between that which is actual and that which is 
potential is irrelevant if it is admitted that that which 
is actual atomizes the continuum. The concepts of 
12Ford, personal letter, 1gs4, p. 2. 
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atomization and the proeression of an unbroken continuum 
are mutually exclusive when considering the spacetime 
continuum of relativity physics. Given our current 
understanding of the physical universe, the process 
theologian must hold time to be an unbroken flow in order 
to maintain consistency with Einsteinian physics. However, 
an unbroken flow does not allow for "points in time' at 
which reality "is." 
The process necessity for durations in time has 
rarnifi cat ions beyond mere inconsistencies with relativity 
physics. Another problem involves the ability of actual 
entities to maintain selfhood and meaningful cmnsciousness 
as events actualize along the spacetime continuum. 
The classical concept of the individual is one in 
which there is continuity. Although there are personal 
aspects that change there is an underlying "self" that 
makes "me" the same "me" I 1-1as yesterday and will be 
tomorrow. As individuals, we reflect on past events and 
anticipate future events but can experience events only as 
they are actual. However, it is the biblical position that 
the same individual experiences each present. Gruenler 
writes: 
Without the personal pronoun I as the prior 
reference point, there can only be discrete units 
with no relation and no perception from which to 
judge that which they belong, to a person's past, 
present, or future. They would just be "there," 
unrelated. If a concrescing unit is said to 
remember, or to anticipate, then there is 
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introClucerl the lanp:nar:e of a continuous ::tgent vrho 
underlies or transcenos the process of time'. 1 ~ 
Bvt if it is concer1ed that self continuity is necessary to 
the indi.vi<'lun.l, what accounts for this contim1it:v in the 
Tlrocess actual ent i tv? Gruenler nttrihutes continuity to 
the innivich18l soul. He states, "The human soul, . . . does 
not sputter in and 011t of existence every fraction of a 
second."14 Gruenler contends: 
From a bi hli cf'tl nerspect i ve, that personA.l I is a 
creation of God and a gift, a soul that accounts 
for the unity of the so-called atomic events. The 
discrete events cannot of themselves prot'!nce a 
unified self. 15 
Continu1 ty of the self is therefore assurec1 by the 
existence of an eternal 
characteriGtics may change vith 
soul. 
+" ulme' 
While 
the self 
certain 
remains 
continuous. Both -continuity of the inrlivioual and 
meaningful consciousness are rationally held under a 
concept of nonatomizen time flow. Events, or that which is 
presently actual, produces an unbroken stream of renl i ty 
>lh i ch nm1res the soul continuous and corresponding 
experience possible. Vlhi le biblical theism resolves the 
issue of i nd i vi dual existence anr'l consciousness, the 
process theist and his -p1..mctuaten cant i nuum exne r i ence 
great difficulties re~nrr1ing these issues. 
13Royce G. Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983), p. 109. 
14noycn G. Gruenler, The Inexhnustihle God, p. 96. 
1SRoyce G. Gruen1er, The Inexhanstible Goo, p. 110. 
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As we shall recall, actual occasions (i.e. the composition 
of reality at tn) occur, if we adopt the process view of 
time passage, at a specific duration or point in time. 
With the actualization of A02 at t2, A01 at t1, with all of 
its corresponding components, perishes in its actuality. 
The components of A01 remain nothing more than eternal 
objects, pure possibilities for future actualities. It 
must also be remembered that actual entities compose every 
actual occasion but, like other components, cease to "be" 
as spacetime progresses from t1 to t2· John Cobb addresses 
this concept when he writes that: 
The easiest \'lay to understand this vrould be to 
regard God, like human persons, as a living 
person. A living person is a succession of 
moments of experience with special continuity. 
At any given moment I am just one of those 
occasions, but. when I remember my past and 
anticipate my future, I see myself as a total 
society or sequence of such occasions. God, 
then, at any moment would be an actual entity, 
but viewed retrospecively he would be an infinite 
sequence of divine occasions of experience. It 
is clear that \vhi tehead himself thought of God as 
"an" actual entity rather than as a living 
person. 16 
Given the fact that actual entit~es are nothing more than 
succession of occasions, we must realize that AE2 composing 
A02 has an entirely separate and unique existence from 
those occasions which preceded it. Gruenler addresses this 
issue well when he writes: 
If the conscious personal self is the end result 
of a previous series of I's called "myself," then 
16cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. 188. 
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my new ener~~nt seJf carne only at the end of the 
dernocroted occasion of alJ the myriad feeling 
occaBions of my body that contribute to it. I 
have, or am, my new· "I" only for a fractional 
moment before it too ~ecomes a datum for the next 
emerp;ing "I.". Hence the "self" lives into 
unrealized possibilities of the future ann has 
only a momentAry immediacy in the present before 
it perishes as a. dead datum into the paRt. A 
continuous series of substantially unrelateil 
"I's" constit-1..1te the "person," with no enduring 
suhstnntial self to remember the past or 
anticipate the future.17 
and are components of two separate actual 
occasions. A:C1 present in A01 , at t1 is no longer in 
exi:Jtence at t2! Hm.,reve r, according to process thought, 
some concept of con t i m.1 i tv of the "i nd i vi dual" is alleged 
by the resemblance of AE2 to AE1 . 
Although process thought seems to provide for some 
continuity of characteristics bet\veen AE1 and AE2, the 
q1JeRtion to 1Je askefl is: How is there a conti.nui ty of 
consciousness between AE1 and AE2 if both are part of 
completely different occasions? \'lilliam James considers 
the issue of consciousness along the spacetime continuum 
when he says: 
\'li thin each personal consciousness, thought is 
sensibly continuo1.1s. I can only oefine 
continuous as that which is without break, crack 
or division. The only breaches that can 1vell be 
conceived to occur within the limits of a single 
mind would either be interruptions, timegaps 
during which the consciousness went out; or they 
would be breaks in the content of the thought so 
abrupt that what followed had no connection 
whatever with what went hefore.18 
17Royce G. Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, p. 1q. 
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If an actual entity is not the same at t2 as it was at t1, 
the break in consciousness should he so abrupt that there 
is no meaningful conscious "connection whatever with what 
went before!" Although we are referring to the same 
"indivinual," we must not forget that actual entities, a 
success ion of which compose an individual actual entity, 
are separate entities and perish with the concrescence of 
the next actual occasion. According to the process concept 
of the progression of spacetime, 
distinct components of two distinct 
at two distinct points in time. 
AE1 and AE2 are two 
occasions transpiring 
Therefore, under the 
process metaphysic, hmv 1::1 the continuity of individual 
consciousness accounted for? 
The point is that if there is no continuity of 
meaningful actual entity consciousness, both human and 
divine, it 
continuum. 
would 
If AEs 
provide evidence of a punctuated 
are components of completely separate 
occasions actualized at "points in time," there should be 
no coherent thought--but there is! Vli thout continuity of 
actual entity consciousness, meaningful thought 
becomes impossible. For example, an ino.i vidual listening 
to Big Ben chime 12 o'clock should not heir twelve chimes 
in success ion. Rather, he should hear Big Ben chime once 
on twelve separate occasions with no coherent relationship 
to those chimes which preceded them. If Whitehead's 
account of reality is correct, no rational thought 
should be possible. 
saying: 
James again addresses this issue 
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Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself 
chopped up in bits. Such words as "chain" or 
"train" do not describe it fully as it presents 
itself in the first instance. It is not jointed; 
it flovlS. A "river" or "stream" are the 
metaphors by which it is most naturally 
described. In talking of it hereafter, let us 
call it a stream of thought, of consciousness, or 
subjective life. 19 
Contrary to the process notion of an "increment of time" 
punctuating the continuum, the flow of spacetime must 
remain unbroken in order to ac.count for the coherent 
consciousness of individuals. 
However, even if we allow for the process concept of a 
punctuated continuum and meaningful individual 
consciousness, other problems regarding spacetime develop. 
If the spacetime continuum is atomized and novel actual 
entities come in and out of existence at every moment, 
individual freedom becomes meaningless. While the process 
theologian may claim that the individual is only partially 
determined by prehended data, any "free choice" an actual 
entity makes will not effect the entity who chooses. AE2 
must live with the choice of AE1 while it, in turn, chooses 
However, those who make the choice never 
experience its consequences. The "choice" I made as AE1 is 
experienced by a different "I" as AE2· 'J:herefor e, the 
freedom of the individual to choose is meaningless because 
the actual entity which makes a choice at t1 is not the 
same entity at t2 which experiences the results of earlier 
19Ibid., p. 159. 
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decisions.20 If the individual is merely a succession of 
actual occasions along the atomized spacetime continuum, 
then freedom of choice is absurd because no choice can ever 
effect the entity who makes it. 
If the actuaJization of each actual occasion is 
somehow overlapping, many problems regarding individual 
identity may be resolved. Gruenler states that: 
If there are no gaps between occasions but rather 
overlapping, then time is a continuous flow and 
the atomic theory of time must be jetisonea.21 
But the atomic theory of time is central to process 
concepts of ontology. The proceds theist must, therefore, 
insist that events are actualized along a punctuated 
continuum. However, additional difficulties arise for 
process thought. If there is a point in time at which an 
event comes into being and another perishes, there must be 
a point at "\vhich nothing exists. 22 Again, Gruenler 
addresses this issue when he writes: 
The difficulty is that 
atomic theory of time .. 
gaps between s;;ccess i ve 
nothing exists. ,_3 
Whitehead's epochal or 
.leads to the problem of 
occasions during which 
If this is so, two interesting problems arise. 
The first problem involves the issue of cause and 
effect. Understanding that event X and event Y are two 
20Royce Gordon Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983), pp. 109-110. 
21Royce G. Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, p. 98. 
22rbid., p. 95. 
23Ibicl. 
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separate occasions, how can we say that event X can affect 
event Y if both events are separated by a point of 
non-existence--the point in between the perishing of X and 
the full actualization of Y? Gruenler, considering a 
process critique by Rem Edwards, writes: 
If there is a gap between occasions, how can a 
completely perished occasion function causally to 
present data to its successor? Goa cannot be 
drawn in as the ground of givenness of the past 
to bridge the past. . . [for J the process system 
allows no divine prehension of contemporaries.24 
How can two separate, distinct, individual events have any 
affect upon one another if they are separated hy a point 
when nothing "is?'' It would appear that, given the concept 
of an atomized spacetime continuum, event X cannot affect 
event Y! 
The second difficulty revolves around the existence 
and continuity of God's consequent nature. If, there is a 
point along the spacetime continuum at which X is no longer 
actual and Y has not achieved full being, must God create 
ex nihilo in order to bring Y into being? It would appear 
that he must, for if there is a period of "non-being" after 
A01 perishes and before A02 is fully actualized, from where 
does A02 come? If there is a point of non-being between 
and there is nothing actually existing 
"immediately" prior to the actualization of A02 from which 
A02 can be composed. If the continuum is punctuated, it 
would appear that God must create ex nihilo each time a new 
24Royce G. Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, p. 97. 
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event is actualized. While this would allow for the 
continuation of physical reality, it betrays the concept of 
God as a divine artificer working only with material "on 
hand." If, ho-vrever, it is held that God cannot create "out 
of nothing" and the spacetime continuum is ato'mized, then 
there are points at which portions of physical reality, the 
components of God's consequent nature cease to exist! If 
God is held to be a continuous actual entity, he must still 
bring reality back from nonexistence for each disjunctive 
AE. If God is a series of disjunctive AEs himself, he must 
bring himself back from nonexistence as he pulsates in and 
out of actuality with each atomic unit of time. 
If spacetime is an unpunctuated flow, there can be no 
"point in time" at which an actual occasion can actualize 
itself. However, to function under the process metaphysic, 
the theologian must contend that there are points in time 
or "moments of concrescence" at which actual occasions 
transpire. This view of a finite point along the spacetime 
continuum allows for a moment at which an AO can be 
actualized but results in 
spacetime continuum. The 
a punctuated 
problem for 
vie\v 
the 
of the 
process 
theologian is that hoth vie,,rs 
essential to the development 
of the spacetime continuum, 
of process theism, are 
inconsistent when held together. 
The Creative Advance of God 
The Einsteinian spacetime flow also causes problems 
for process theism's concept of God's "creative advance" 
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and his relationships "in" time. Accoril i ng to David Ray 
Griffin, the "evolutionary development of our world is 
manifesting tr1e creative purrose of God .n25 The evolution 
dis cussed is not ~ust biological for it incJudes social, 
political, cultural, and other advance~ents. The univerRe 
is not considered to be progressing by chance but, rather, 
advances with the direction supplied by the lures of God.26 
God continues to provide eternal objects, placing the 
uni verGe on a path to\vard ever-increasing goodness ann 
complexity. Therefore, it is God's a1 m to bring about the 
greatest pass i ble good (i.e. the greatest complexity) by 
directing the 11niverse along the evolutionary scale.27 
The purpose of this "creative aovance" is better 
understood when we realize that: 
. in the foundations of his being, God is 
indifferent to preservation and to novelty. He 
cares not whether the immediate occasion is old 
or new, so far as it concerns derivation from its 
ancestry. His aim is for oepth of satisfaction 
as an intermediate step towards the fulfillment 
of his m·m being. This God is a being 'vhose 
conceptual valuation is underiveil from that of 
any other entity and vJho, in urging the 
realization of the possibilities he entertains, 
aims at his own self-satisfaction.28 
The great creative evolutionary advance is, therefore, 
plotted and directed by the nrocess God in order to provide 
?5David Ray Griffin, God, Power and Evil: A Process 
Theodicy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), p. 285. 
2Eirjaurence 1~. Wilmot, Whitehead and God (Waterloo, 
0 n t a r i o : \Ji 1 f r e d 1 a v r i e r U n 1-\-, e-~ r-s-.1-.t_:,_r_ -, ---..-1 "9""7...,9').--, -p-.- 87 . 
27cobb and Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory 
Exposition, p. 67. 
28cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. 188. 
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himself with richer and more complex experiences. 
The fact that God seeks richer experiences29 
illustrates 
actualizing 
the process concept that 
(i.e. learning, growing, 
God, himself, is 
evolving) as each 
event in the universe unfolds before his watchful eye. 
However, it is important to remember that the eye of the 
process God is "in" time. Therefore, in order to fully 
prehend the entire universe, he can no longer be under a 
single time frame but must account for multiple rates of 
time progression. At this point, process theism shows 
another flaw. First, if there exists something that can 
travel at the speed of light or faster, as many scientists 
theorize there may be, time for that entity is running in 
reverse (see Equation 2).30 If such a state of affairs is 
actual it must then be understood that part of God's body, 
physical reality traveling at the speed of light, could 
then de-evolve as events decline 
evolutionary scale. Portions of 
in complexity along the 
God's mind would also 
regress in the evolutionary process as AOs from the 
hypothetical entity run in reverse providing less complex 
EOs for storage in the mind of God. The process God would 
be placing less complex eternal objects into his memory. 
Although God is thought to have a perfect memory and would 
continue to absorb new experiences, the experiences 
absorbed would be perpetually less complex than those which 
29John Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. 180. 
30Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, p. 80 
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preceded it. Such a situation would limit God's purpose in 
establishing ever-increasing complexity throughout all 
actuality (i.e. the universe) leading to greater possible 
good. Clearly, the speed of light becomes the hypothetical 
limit to the process God's ability to realize his aim 
toward complexity for that entity and for an ever-richer 
experience for himself. 
God, in this present cosmic epoch, appears to be 
limited by the speed of light and its relationship to time, 
for if objects could travel faster than light, portions of 
the actualized universe vrould begin to de-evolve as they 
regress in complexity. However, let us assume, for the 
sake of argument, that time is advancing forward, that 
evolution is progressing onward toward greater complexity, 
and that God is realizing his creative advance for the 
universe. At this point, a second problem appears. 
Lewis Ford and David Griffin both recogni'ze that the 
universe is finite and that there is a finite number of 
pure possibilities available for actualization. Does this 
mean that there must be one finite point along the 
spacetime continuum at which the maximum possible good for 
the total universal system is achieved? It would seem that 
if there are only a finite number of possibilities that may 
be actualized, there must be some point along the continuum 
at which every combination of possibilities would be 
realized. If God continues to lure toward ever-increasing 
complexity, one could logically conclude that at least one 
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comhination of actualized possibilities would result in the 
greatest complexity and the maximum pass i ble good. This, 
however, is not necessarily the case. 
As one considers God's efforts to bring about the 
creative advance of all that is actualized, one must 
remember that the spacetime continuum is not flowing at a 
uniform rate throughout the universe. Alan Gragg, 
commenting on the process theism of Charles Hartshorne, 
writes: 
Modern relativity physics holds that there may be 
a definite cosmic past and a definite cosmic 
future but not a definite present. However, 
Hartshorne's philosophy sharply distinguishes 
between a fully determin~d past and an 
indeterminate future. Apparently, God must have 
an objectively right frame of reference from 
which to determine the simultaneous 
present. . . . 31 
The problem is that there is no simultaneous, universal, 
present given Einsteinian relativity. 
Because time, and therefore complexity, advances at 
different rates throughout the universe, it is possible for 
the ultimate good to be achieved in one part of the 
universe before it is achieved in others. If one part of 
the universe were to reach ultimate good before the others, 
would that mean that the process stops in that part of 
God's body? The purpose of the process is to attain the 
ultimate good, or richness of divine experience, but if the 
possibilities are exhausted and good in that part of the 
31 Alan Gragg, Charles Hartshorne (Waco: 
1973), p. 109. 
Word Books, 
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universe is achieved, what purpose would the process 
continue to serve? Again, Lewis Ford says: 
No part of the Universe, on achieving the good, 
would be put on hold, for temporality is 
inexorable, and ne'\v aims would be met, more or 
less imperfectly.32 
Therefore, one part of the universe cannot wait for another 
part of the universe to catch up in goodness. Good cannot 
be achieved on a uniform front but, rather, is " 
achieved. .sporadically, depending on creative 
response."33 An example may be helpful here. 
10 c 01 
Figure G 
All of the universe (C) must be in a condition of ultimate 
good simultaneously· for the maximum total good of the 
entire universe to be achieved. If one part of the 
universe (A) has reached ultimate good, Cloes 1t go into a 
holding pattern waiting for the rest of the universe (B) to 
catch up? If so, we could say that the process would not 
be occurring for time would be standing still (i.e. time 
progression is necessary in order to actualize successive 
actual occasions) in that "good" part of the universe (A) . 
God would be learning nothing from that portion of the 
universe (A) because nothing would be advancing. If that 
specific portion of the universe which has reached ultimate 
32Ford, personal letter, p. 3· 
33roid., p. 4. 
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good begins to de-evolve in order to perpetuate the 
continuity of the process (i.e. after maximum good is 
achieved, the only way for the process to move 1vould be in 
the direction of less complex actual occasions), then the 
cosmic maximum good for the universe as a complete system 
can never be achieved. 
However, you cannot compartmentalize the universe for 
that which forms the actual occasions of one section of the 
universe (A and B) forms the actual occasion for the entire 
universe as a system (C). Therefore, given the concept of 
non-uniform universal time flow, God's desired ends, as 
evidenced by the maximum possible good for the entire 
universe, will never be achieved. As soon as one part of 
the universe (A) is brought into ultimate good the 
influence from the section still evolving (B) will bring it 
(A) back out of ultimate good. Therefore, the ultimate 
good for the universe (C), as a system, can never be· 
actualized. AOs must then be separated in order tc qchieve 
ultimate good for the entire system, but they cannot be 
because you cannot segment the universe. Therefore, the 
universe must achieve a simultaneous ultimate good but 
simultaneity has no place in Einstein's relativity physics. 
Lewis Ford recognizes the difficulties inherent in 
contending that the universe could achieve a simultaneous 
ultimate good l::Jut he respon,ls to the present critique by 
saying: 
If there L.; an infinity of cosmic epochs, each 
with their own possibilities of realization, it 
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is difficult to see rtOW this whole process could 
be maximized.34 
However, if we accept that there are an infinite number of 
cosmic epochs, each with their possibilities, the problem 
of ultimate good still remains for that specific cosmic 
epoch under consideration. We can say, with some 
certainty, that there is no simultaneity of time in our 
current cosmic epoch so the Question can still be raisen: 
How will God achieve universal ultimate good for our 
present epoch given our non-uniform time flow? Admitting 
that there may be other cosmic epochs with other 
possibilities but recognizing the problems of temporal 
simultaneity in our present cosmic epoch, God cannot assume 
that the maximum good for our universal cosmic epoch will 
ever be reached. 
Lewis goes on to say that: 
[Process theism]. . is not committed to the 
complete consummation of the universe in the 
universe per se, for the real consummation takes 
place within the conseQuent nature of God--that 
~s where heaven is.35 · 
Such a position should lead one to ask: Will the process, 
directed by G-od, ever have an actual consummation? Not in 
any final sense, for if there are an infinite number of 
cosmic epochs and correc~onding possibilities, the God of 
33rbid., p. 4. 
34Ibid. 
35rbid. 
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process theism -vrill continue to self-enrich himself with 
experiences of greater com-plexity as he continues to lure 
the process on eon after eon, ad infinitum. Tf we a.'ccept 
the contention that God continues to direct the process 
th.at has no actual resolution, one should 1vonder "why." 
John Cobb asks this very question when he writes: 
In all other ent 1 ties sat is facti on is not 
attained except as the completion of the entity. 
If God is a slngle entity who will never be 
comp le teo, then on this analogy, he can never 
knmv satisfaction. It woulrl be odd that God 
should eternally aim at a goal that ls in 
principle unreachable, and Whitehead explicitly 
refers to God's satisfaction as something reaJ..3b 
It appears inconsistent to think that God would continue a 
process that has no culmination, prod the process along the 
spacetime continuum while taking aim at something that can 
never be achieved, when he is the only one who will realize 
any lasting benefits. 
The Uncoordinated Universe 
Another major question concerning process theism 
arises when vle again consider the relationship of God to 
time. Accordi.ng to process theology, God is not separated 
from time but is "in" time just as other temporal 
creatures. 37 The next CJ_uestion to be considered is: Does 
God, as we do, have only one point of reference from 
1vhich to observe the happenings of the universe? 
36cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. 189. 
37Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, p. 91-q2. 
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According to the theory of relativity, it is impossible for 
an observer in time to have more thRn one reference point. 
Although God is not an exclusively physical object, he does 
have a physical pole vlhi ch -places him "in" time. 
Therefore, i:' God is going to remain consistent with the 
laws of contemporary physics he, too, can have but one 
point of reference. If God is going to remain in time and 
consistent Hith the principles of Einsteinian science, it 
will become impossible for the process to take place under 
his direction. 
It must be realized that if God has but one point of 
reference from \vhich to prehenn the universe, he will be· 
subject to tl1e same relative variation in time as other 
temporal actual entities. Different parts of the universe, 
or God's body, will be progressing at different rates. The 
qllestion to be asl<ed is: \'lhich time frFtme is God "in?" Is 
he in mine? lie must be if he is going to provide effective 
lures at t1 in my personal time frame. However, the 
problem is that God must provide lures to all AOs in all 
reference frames throughout the entire universe. In a 
sense, the entir~ universe must be thought of as one 
simultaneous actual occasion if God is to provide lures at 
t1 in every time frame. Difficulties arise when we 
remember that AOs happen at a specific point in time (t1) 
in reality, but there is no unifori'l time flow that would 
allow for a universal actual occasion which, in turn, would 
allow for a universal lure. From an individual actual 
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entity's point of reference in time at t1, · lures for an 
actual occasion are required "novr" but part of the 
composition for this "present" AO at t1 is also required at 
t2 in another part of the universe. The difficulty is that 
if God is in time he can only supply eternal objects to 
those with whom he shares a temporal frame of reference. 
He cannot supply lures for the universe as a system! 
God has only one point of reference in time through 
which he may provide possibilities for actualization 
throughout the universal system. ; Hm·rever, the universe is 
not one big, •..p un1.Lorm, unified time frame. Viewing the 
universe in its entirety, it is impossible for God to 
provide universal lures because, even for the process God, 
no unified time frame exists. One may be able to talk 
about specific, individual possibilities and actual 
occasions for specific parts of the universe, but one 
cannot speak of one comprehensive actual occasion or lure 
transpiring or being supplied for the entire system. God 
may then exercise limited control over small portions of 
the uni verne, the port ion that God is "in," hut he cannot 
coordinate lure~3 fnr tlle entire system because he must have 
just one point of reference through ,,rhich to prehend the 
universe an~ reality is actualizing in multiple time 
frames. 
Chapter Four 
THE LIMITED GOD 
As we consider the ramifications of God's existence in 
time, we must conclude that the tenets of process thought 
are in cons is tent with portions of relativity theory. In 
the previous chapter, we considered the problematic process 
concept of time flow, the advance toward ultimate good, and 
God's apparent inability to offer effective direction to 
the universe as a system. Let us now further examine the 
relationships of God in time and his ability to function 
under the laws of the physical universe of relativity 
physics. 
~s God Really God? 
For many centuries, man has centered his worship 
around that which he considers to be God or the gods. The 
controversy regarding what should be worshipped as God 
continues to this present day, for many of the world's 
theologies 
However, it 
are still vying fDr the minds of men. 
is rare among contemporary theologians for 
there to be a competition for the position of "supreme 
being" within one theological system. This very situation 
appears to be taking place in the structure of process 
theism. 
Anselm vras the first to develop an argument for the 
existence of God based upon ontology and its predicates. 
This argument has been adopted and reformed over the yea~s 
by various theologians, one among them being the process 
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thinker, Charles Hartshorne. 1 Simply expressed, the 
argument states: 1) God is a Being of which none greater 
can be conceived; 2) A Being which none greater can be 
conceived must exist; 3) Therefore, God must exist. There 
are several unstated premises involved in the argument--one 
of them being that existence is an attribute--but assuming 
that they are correct the quest ion becomes: Within the 
process system, what is the greatest thing that can be 
conceived? Recognizing that all measurement is relative 
with respect to point8 of reference, Einstein applied his 
scientific concepts to our understanding of mass and 
velocities. This application has a significant impact upon 
our certainty of the identity of a God in time. Given 
concepts of relativity physics, matter in motion, and the 
"creativity" of the process metaphysic, ambiguities arise 
regarding who God really is. 
Expanding an e~uation developed by a fellow physicist, 
H. A. Lorentz, Einstein concluded that as velocities 
increase, the length of an object would decrease with 
respect to the direction of motion.2 
Equation 2 
1Fredric F. Fost, "Relativity Theory and Hartshorne's 
Dipolnr Trteism," in Two Process Philosophers, ed. Lewis' 
Ford (Tallahassee: American Academy of Religion, 1973), 
P· 97-
2Franklin ,J. Miller, Jr., College Physics, 4th ed. 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, Inc., 1977), p. 
1 62. 
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This contraction in length would only be detected hy 
another observer through his point of reference because all 
measurement devices traveling at the same velocity would 
correspondingly contract. 
Therefore, if two objects were passing one another at 
velocities approaching the speed of light, both observers 
would consioer themselves to be at a "normal" length and 
that which they observe to be "distorted." However, both 
would be correct in their measurement with respect to that 
which they observe because measurement is relative with 
respect to the point of observation. According to Equation 
2, the length of a physical object traveling at the speed 
of light would go to zero. The velocity of the speed of 
light becomes the universal absolute for it is the maximum 
velocity for material objects. The physical object 
traveling at such a velocity would no longer spacially 
exist! 
Another aspect relevant to the consideration of 
objects in motion is Einstein's concept of mass increase 
with increased velocity. Just as the speed of light became 
the impenetrable boundary for physical objects with length, 
so it is for objects with mass. According to Einstein's 
theory and corresponding equations, the mass of an object 
continues to increase as the velocity of the object 
approaches the speed of light.3 According to the equation: 
3James A. Coleman, Relativity for the Layman (New 
York: New American Library, 1958), p. 71. 
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M 2 
- v 
Equation 3 
If an object reaches the speed of light, its mass, 
theoretically, becomes infinite. Once again, the speed of 
light becomes the speed at which no material object can 
travel, for it would require an infinite amount of energy 
to propel an i nfi ni te amount of mass at such a velocity. 
As considered in E = mc2, an object's mass correspondingly 
approaches infinity thus requiring all available energy in 
the universe to achieve that velocity. This, of course, is 
a scientific impossibility. mak;ing the speed of light 
unattainable for physical objects. 
Because of the. relationship between physical objects 
and the speed of light, an interesting phenomenon occurs in 
relation to addition of object velocities. According to 
t'be theory of relativity, no matter what the velocity of 
two approaching objects relative to one another may be, the 
addition of their velocities can never exceed the speed of 
light.4 This relationship is illustrated in the following 
equation: 
Equation 4a 
4Albert Einstein, The Meaning of Relativity (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1959), p. 37. 
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An example may be helpful here: 
I 
A C ....------B 
100 miles/sec. 100 miles/sec. 
100,000 miles/sec. 100,000 miles/sec. 
Figure H 
If object A is traveling at a velocity of 100 miles/sec~, 
and object B is traveling at 100 miles/sec., and they are 
both traveling toward one another with observer C directly 
between them, we could say, under the old Newtonian system, 
that the combinea velocity of A and B with respect to C is 
200 miles/sec. 
Equation 4b 
However, if we increase the volocity of A and B to 100,000 
miles/sec., we notice a problematic result if we try to 
combine their velocities. If one removes C as a reference 
point, thus rendering the velocities of A and B relative to 
each other, one cannot obtain the results of Equation 4b. 
Because the speed of light is the absolute velocity at 
which no physical object can travel, and because velocity 
measurement is relative with respect to the point of 
observation, we cannot have an answer of 200,000 miles/sec. 
Because light travels at only 186,000 miles/sec. and a 
physical object's relative velocity cannot attain the speed 
of light, it is necessary to apply Einstein's concepts of 
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velocity addition as illustrated in Equation 4a. 
Therefore, the correct velocity addition of A and B is 
155,000 miles/sec.5 After our consideration of Equations 
2, 3, and 4a, we must conclude that the speed of light is 
the absolute velocity at which no material object can 
trave] in Einstein's universe. 
With the speed of light firmly established as the 
ultimate boundary for physical object velocities, we must 
begin to raise some serious questions regarding the origin 
of such laws. Let us suppose that God wanted to lure an 
actual entity to travel at light speed in order to achieve 
his aim at greater complexity. Could he do it? According 
to the theorieR of relativity, he could not, even if the 
actual entity was willing to conform his subjective aim to 
perfectly match the divine initial aim. The question then 
becomes: Who placed this restriction upon God and the 
universe? \vho established the speed of light to be an 
absolute? Ford may contend that it is inherent in the 
process metaphysic and our current cosmic epoch but, at 
this point, questions regarding supremacy and the identity 
of God begin to surface. 
Whitehead believed that there was a God of this 
relative universe because: 
The universe presents itself to our attention as 
a process of becoming which is the becoming of 
5coleman, Relativity for the Layman, p. 67. 
6Laurence F. Wilmot, Whitehead and God (Waterloo, 
0 n tar i o : W i 1 fred La v r i e r U n 1~. v-e-r-s"i't-, y-, --.1 -;:;:9~7~9:--~):-,-p-. 1 6 . 
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actual entities, and ... there is needed a ground 
of becoming, an explanation df the fact of there 
being a universe, and of its being this 
particular universe.6 
It is clear that the physical universe is not the 
metaphysical ground of all being and physical laws, but 
Whitehead acknowledges that God is not either. Whitehead's 
universe is a universe of creative process and God is 
merely postulated to explain the existence of a reservoir 
of pure possibilitiAs which actualize into rea1ity. 
Whitehead expresses his semi-subordination of God to the 
process itself when he says: 
Neither God nor the world reach static 
completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate 
metaphysical ground, the creative advance into 
novelty.? 
Clearly, the ultimate metaphysical ground which makes 
possible the creative advance defining the confines of 
physical laws along the spacetime continuum is not "God" 
but the process of creativity itself. 
The question for the process theologian then is not 
whether God exists, but rather which concept of being is 
the greatest that can be conceived--God of the possibili-
ties, the process of creativity, the ultimate metaphysical 
ground? It must be remem1)ered that creat:ivi ty is necessary 
for the continued exjstence of God, for without the process 
there could be no actualization of God's lures and no 
consequent nature. However, God is also necessary for the 
7John B. 
(Philadelphia: 
Cobb, A Christian Natural 
Westminster Press, 1974), p. 167. 
Theology 
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perpetuation of the process, for he supplies the 
possibilities for realization. It may then be contended 
that God encompasses all of reality so that the process is, 
to some extent, a part of God. However, the question still 
remains regarding the identity of that which is "supreme,"· 
for how can one part of God be in the "grip" of another 
part of God? \'lould not this mean that God cannot even 
control himself? Does God "grip" himself? If Whitehead 
declares the creative a<1vance of the process to be the 
metaphysical ground of this relative universe able to have 
both God and the ~orld in its grip, then the creativity is 
the greatest which can be conceived and is truly "God". 
The term ''God" merely describes an attribute of the process 
itself. If there is any distinction between God and 
creativity, the creativity clearly should be God. 
A follower of process theism may conceivably respond 
that God is still "God" in spite of his apparent 
subordination to the process. The question may then be 
raised: Who created this creativity and the corresponding 
physical laws of this cosmic epoch that has God in its 
"grip"? The traditional process position is to contend 
that God is not the originator of the process or the laws 
that grip him. Some may believe the process to be inherent 
in the make-up of the universe.B But why is the process to 
be considered inherent? The process and corresponding 
BDavid Ray Griffin, God, Power and Evil: A Process 
Theodicy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), p. 279. 
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physical lawG are merely a description of relationships 
between God's mental and physical poles. To say that the 
process and the laws of relativity physics are inherent to 
the composition of the Einsteinian universe is to say that 
God operates the way he does because God operates the way 
he does. This, however, does not ans\ver the question 
regarding their origin. 
If the process that has God in its "grip" and the 
relative laws that limit his actualization of lures are not 
inherent in the composition of the universe, and he is not 
their originator, we can only arrive at one conclusion. 
The God of process theology is being gripped by the 
creativity of a process and limited by laws that have their 
origination in another source. Since we, as actual 
entities, are subject to the same process as the God of 
process theism, it can be conclu.ded that we a.re not the 
source of the process nor relative physical laws. If it is 
not us nor the God of process theology that is the source 
of the process that grips all of reality, the source must 
be a thing that is superior to all. But if the God of 
process thought is in the grip of a process and laws that 
have their origin with a superior entity, who, then, is the 
God behind God? If there is a God behind the God of 
process theism, we must contend that the process God is not 
really a God but merely an entity subordinate to the 
creative procese and, in some sense, superior to us. 
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The Ultimate Actual Entity 
As previously considered, that which provides the 
basis for that which we perceive as reality are actual 
occasions. These arrrmgements of matter in reality at a 
point along the spacetime continuum are composed of actual 
entities. Whitehead considers the actual entity when he 
writes: 
Actual entities. .are the final real things of 
which the world is made up. .[However] God is 
an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff 
of existence in far-off empty space. But though 
there are graduations of importance, and 
diversities of function, yet in the principles 
which actually exemplifies reality all are on the 
same level. The final facts are all alike, 
actual entities; and these actual entities are 
all drops of experience, complex and 
interdependent.9 
For Whitehead, God is the ultimate actual entity for he 
encompasses all that "is." God is all that is actualized 
along the spacetime continuum. 
However, as one reflects on the nature of the 
Einsteinian spacetime continuum, one begins to ask 
questions about the concept of God as the ultimate actual 
entity. As established in previous chapters, time does not 
flow at a uniform rate throughout the universe. Rather, 
time flows at a non-uniform rate throughout the universe 
relative to the reference point of the observer. Instead 
of time advancing along a uniform front, it has the traits 
of water spilled on the ground. Such free flowing water 
9Alfred North Whitehead, "Process and Reality," in 
Alfred North \<lhi tehead, An Anthology, ed. F. S.C. Northrop 
and Mason W. Gross (New York: MacMillan Co., 1953), 
p. 585. 
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does not move at a uniform rate on a unified front but 
surges and ebbs as it moves along. So it is with relative 
time progression. This non-uniform rate of spacetime flow 
led us to the conclusion that there could be no universal 
actual occasion at t1, for t1 cannot be simultaneously 
reached throughout the universe as a system. This concept 
of relative time flow again causes problems for process 
theism. 
Whitehead believes that God encompasses all of reality 
and is, therefore, one big all-inclusive actual entity. 
All that is actualized at t1 and all that potentially could 
be actualized is God. David Griffin writes of Whitehead's 
position when he says: 
For vlhi tehead, God is a single actual entity. 
Hence the d~ vine polarity must be that of an 
actual entity. Analogously to all actual 
entities, the nature of God is dipolar. He has a 
primordial nature and a consequent nature. The 
primordial nature is analogous to the conceptual 
pole of an actual entity, while the consequent 
nature corresponds to the physical pole, so that 
in God the conceptual 'pole prehends the 
physical. 1 0 
All that is actual is God. For Whitehea~, then, the God of 
dipolar theism is to be considered one single actual 
entity. 
Given contemporary concepts of the relative spacetime 
continuum, the concept of God as a single actual entity 
becomes problematic. Because of the non-uniform rate at 
1 Onavid Ray Griffin, "Hartshorne's Differences from 
Whitehead," in Tvro Process Philosophers, ed. Lewis S. Ford 
(Tallahassee: American Academy of Religion, 1973), p. 35. 
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which time progresses throughout the universe, we cannot 
talk about simultaneous time throughout the system of 
reality. If there is no simultaneous time (t1) throughout 
the universe at which all of reality becomes actualized' 
one cannot speak of "an" actual occasion at t1 which 
encompasses the entire universe as a system. There is no 
simultaneous time which would allow for a universal actual 
occasion. Therefore, God cannot be thought of as a single 
universal actual entity because there is no universal time 
at which a universal actual entity could be actualized. 
Because time is relative with respect to the reference 
point of the observer, we can only speak of actual 
occasions taking place at t1 inside each individual 
reference frame. There are, then, as many actual occasions 
taking place as there are points of reference. Although we 
may still attempt to speak of God as a single actual 
entity, God can only be one out of the infinite number that 
are "contemporaneously" being actualized. If only one 
actual entity can be God, which actual entity is he? The 
problem for process thought is that one cannot consider God 
to be one universal entity actualized at t1, for there is 
no simultaneous t1 throughout the universe that, would allow 
for the existence of a universal actual entity ( AE1). 
Because there can 
spacetime, there can 
entity. This means 
be no all-encompassing frame of 
be no single all-encompassing actual 
that if God is to encompass all of 
reality, as is implied by his consequent and primordial 
natures, he cannot be a single actual entity. 
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The process theologian, Charles Hartshorne, 
recognizes, although for different reasons, that the 
concPpt of God as a single actual entity is incorrect. 
Hartshorne attempts to bypass the single actual entity 
approach to God while adopting a concept that still allows 
God to be all-encompassing. Hartshorne chooses to view God 
as a society of actual occasions thus allowing for a 
non-simultaneous flow of time. He correspondingly abandons 
the concept of God as the single divine AE. Again, Griffin 
writes of Hartshorne's concepts, saying: " .Hartshorne 
[contends]. .God should be regarded as a living person, 
i.e. , a personally ordered society of experience." 11 
Hartshorne has recently suggested a modification in that: 
God is perhaps a "society of societies, a 
multiplicity of persons. " This revised 
view vTould mean that one cannot speak of God 
"now", but only of God "here-now", which \vould 
not be the same concrete reality as God 
"somewhere else now.n12 
Hartshorne describes God as "here'and now" so that he may 
be present in all actual occasions given the lack of a 
universal "now." This concept of God "here and now" 
precludes God from being considered a single actual entity. 
If God is considered "here and now," he may remain 
compatible with relativity physics and still be thought of 
as encompassing all of reality. God may then be considered 
to be a society or multiplicity of all contemporaneous 
actual occasions. 
11Ibid., p. 36. 
12Ibid. 
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Although Hartshorne's concept of God as a society of 
contemporaneous actual occasions may solve some of the 
process inconsistencies with the theory of relative time 
flow, it raises another serious theological question. If 
each actual occasion is disjunctive, as relative time flow 
indicates and Hartshorne appears to concede, on what basis 
can one deny the carge of polytheism? Cannot each 
individual actual occasion be considered an individual 
process God? Actual occasions are actualized disjunctively 
throughout the universe. For each point of reference there 
is an individual actual occasion actualized. On what basis 
do we insist that these disjunctive actual occasions be 
incorporated into a single contemporaneous actual occasion? 
If all reality is hi polar, as process thought con tends, 
then each actual entity could conceivably have its own 
primordial and consequent nature disjunctive from all other 
actual entities. By acknowledging that each actual 
occasion is only contemporaneous 
Hartshorne has left his concept of a 
allegations of polytheism. If each 
with all others, 
societal God open to 
actual entity is a 
disjunctive process God, no process theist can speak of a 
creative advance for there is no necessary, single, or 
superior God who will provide lures and thus some 
coordination for the universe as a system. 
Another problem arises when we consider God as a 
society of actual entities. Hartshorne, just as other 
process thinkers, holds that a given actual entity is 
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partially determined hy its own subjective aim and 
partially determined hy the lure of God and previous 
events. 13 Because each actual entity can be cons ide red 
disjunctively from the rest of the universe as a system, 
problems arise when we consider the causation of individual 
actual entities. Hartshorne does not believe the universe 
was created ex nihilo but has alvrays existed in one form or 
another.14 Therefore: 
.The world has had no beginning; 
thus ·becomes an actually infinite 
all the paradoxicalities involved 
conception. 15 
the universe 
reality with 
in such a 
Ullen \ve consiCler the issue of causation in the relative 
universe of the process metaphysic, each actual occasion 
becomes a disjunctive infinite regress with no explanation 
as to its initial cause. 
After considering process concepts of universal and 
disjunctive actual occasions, vre are left -v.ri th two 
problematic choices. If one holil s that God is a single 
actual entity j_nclusive of all that "is," such a concept 
will be hel(~ inconsistently wi t,h concepts of relativity 
physics and the' s-pacetime cant inn urn. Because there is no 
universal "no"\T," there can he no universal acttml entity 
that encompasPes the entire system. If, on the other hand, 
we adopt the concept of God as a society of contemporaneous 
13n.oyce Gorilon Gruenler, The Inexhn:ustible God (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book llouse, 1983), p. 160. 
14orsgg, Charles Hartshorne, p. 108. 
15Ibid. 
actual entities other 
Hartshorne's concept of 
greater consistency with 
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difficulties arise. 
God "here and now" 
relative time flow 
Although 
allows for 
(i.e. by 
avoiding the need for a universal "present"), the holder of 
this position possibly adopts a concept of polytheism and 
the problems of causation and infinite regress. Although 
process theism requires a God who is an actual entity, 
the available theistic concepts are either inconsistent 
with Einstein's physics 
philosophically unacceptable. 
or 
The Isolation of Man 
theologically and 
Another concept worth consioering at this point 
involves an actual entity's ability to locate material 
objects, including other actual entities, under the 
Newtonian and Einsteinian systems. Given the old system of 
Newtonian physics, objects were simple to locate. For 
example, the location (i.e. distance and direction of a 
point of reference from the origin of the observer's 
reference frame) of OA could be given by the following 
equation: 
OA = V x2 + y2 + z2 
Equation 5 
Al·though we have considered some of the ramifications of 
Einstein's concepts of relative time passage in previous 
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chapters, it is still important to remember that relative 
time progresses non-uniformly throughout the universe. In 
other wor~s. for each point of reference time is relative. 
Therefore, Equation 5 is operational as long as one assumes 
that time passes at a smooth uniform rate throughout the 
universaJ svstem. 
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Equation 5 ho1ns true as long as two observers share a 
unified time and thus exactly the same noint of reference. 
Instead of viewing objects in·three dimensions, as did 
New·ton, Einstein adil_ed a fourth dimension--relative time 
flow. His res11ltJng eqw=ttion for determining the 1oc8.tion 
of an object in rel~tive space is: 
OA = Vx2 + y2 + z2 _ (ct)2 
Equation 6 
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":'his con cent of considering space and time in an 
interrelationship, as denoted by Equation 6, glves objects 
a location in time as well as s-pRee. It is important to 
be.ar in mind that time flovr chan pes ivi th the observer's 
point of referPnce. As the relative time varies, so does 
the exact location of objects in reJative snace. 
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As long as the same point of reference remains constant for 
tlvO; observers. time 1:1ill remain unified for those sharing 
that TJOint. Hovrever, if the noint o:f reference iR varied~ 
the passage of time will be varied. With the variation of 
time flows would come a variation in the observed loc~tion 
f' h . 1 , . t 16 0.. p. 781C8 OOJ8C' ,S. Einstei. n recognized that al thongh 
the difference may remain irnnerceptible to the casual 
ol:serve r _ o b ,j e ct lncn t ion will vary \d th each observer. 
because time 'Passage will vary with each point of 
observation. 
16K. 0. Fredrichs, From Pythagoras to Einstein (New 
York: Random House, 1q65), p. 73. 
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This varj at ion in progression and the 
corresponding problems with object location in relative 
space create further problems for the God of process 
theism. As previously mentioned, time varies with the 
reference point of the observer, and God is no exception to 
the rule. Each individual actual entity has his own unique 
point of reference and thus his own time frame. 
Commensurate with the concept of relative reference 
frames is the notion that the location of physical objects 
along the spacetime continuum will also vary fran observer 
to observer. Thus, while the fact that what observer A. 
believes to be "there" is functionally correct, in 
actuality it is not the same 
given his point of reference. 
variation in object location 
"there" as perceived by 13 
Unfortunately, this relative 
also holds true for the 
process God. It must he remembered that the process God is 
"in" time. There_fore, he never perceives actual entities 
or any other physic9.l object to be in the exact location 
perceived by those entities. Hovl can God exercise even 
limited control over a universe in which he cannot be 
certain of the location of its components? Man is thus cut 
off from God, for how can God truly know humanity when he 
is not sure of an individual's location, his corresponding 
actions, or other expressions of personality? The process 
God appears to be a God limited in his knowledge regarding 
creatures that currently exist--limited by the concepts of 
the relative spacetime continuum. 
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Even if God could overcome the problems presented by 
relativity physics and know man as he "is" at some 
universal t1, man is still isolated from the process God. 
Albert Einstein believed that the concept of a personal God 
had serious Ahortcomings. He wrote: 
In their struggle for the ethical good, teachers 
of religion must have the stature to give up the 
doctrine of a personal God. . in their labors, 
they will have to avail themselves of those 
forces which are capable of cultivating the good 
the true, and the beautiful in humanity itself. 17 
To an extent, this is what process theism renders. While 
process concepts stress the completeness of each AO, they 
render the creator impersonal. 
However, such an impersonal God raises serious 
questions abotlt the personality of man and his ability to 
communicate with the· divine. Francis Schaeffer raises this 
question by asking: If God is ultimately impersonal, what 
accounts for the existence of man's personality? He 
writes: 
No one has ever demonstrated how time plus 
chance, beginning with an impersonal, can produce 
the needed complexity of the universe, let alone 
the personality of man. 18 
Process theism has no valid explanation for the existence 
of man's unique, individual personality. If process theism 
wishes to maintain the existence of a real individual 
17Albert Einstein, "Science and Religion" in Quantum 
Questions, ed. Ken vlilber (Lonoon: New Science I1ibrary, 
1 984) ' p. 11 0. ' 
18Francis Schaeffer, He Is There and He Is Not Silent, 
Wheaton: Tynnale House, 1972), p. 92. 
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personality, communication problems between the personal 
and the impersonal result. It may .be asked: How can 
meaningful communication between the personal and the 
impersonal take place? According to Schaeffer, it cannot. 
While biblical theism has held that God and man are 
separated by the infinity and finiteness of their 
respective spheres, both share common ground. Both are 
personal.19 This shared personality allows meaningful 
communication in the Christian context. Schaeffer writes: 
.suppose that He made something limited, but 
on his own wavelength--let's say in His own 
image--then one would have both an infinite, 
non-created Personal and a limited, created 
personal. On this presupposition, the 
personality of the limited, created personal 
would be explained.20 
He continues by saying: 
Within this framework, why would it be 
unthinkable that a non-created Personal should 
communicate with the created personal in verbal 
form, if the non-created Personal made the 
created personal a language communicating being? 
And we are language communicating beings.21 
Unlike biblical Christian theism, process theism 
offers an impersonal mind of God.22 How can the personal 
mind of man communicate with the impersonal mind of the 
process God? Without shared personality, it appears there 
19Francis Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, (Downers 
Grove: Inter Varsity Press-,-1968), p. 95. 
20Francis Schaeffer, He Is There and He Is Not Silent 
(Wheaton: Tyndale House, 1972), p. 92. 
21 Ibid., -p. 95· 
22Royce Gordon Grunler, The Inexhaustible God (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983), pp. 46-47-
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can be no meaningful communication between man and the 
divine. The mind of the process man is left isolated from 
the impersonal process God. 
The Decay of God 
God in his consequent nature is considered to be in 
time. The ramifications of a God "in" time are 
problematic. A problem worth our consideration involves 
God's relationship to available energy in the universe. 
The availability of energy is very important to the 
God of process theology because all of reality is thought 
to "become" more complex as events are actualized. 
Although we understand that the total amount of energy and 
mass in the relative universe remains constant (i.e. 
E=mc2), we realize that the ratio of potential energy (PE) 
to kinetic energy (KE) is in constant flux. Isaac Asimov 
says of this relationship: 
Given at two different potential levels, it is 
common experience of mankind to ohserve that the 
energy will flow from one potential level (which 
we will call the higher) to another (which we 
will call the lower) and never vice versa (unless 
it is pushed).23 
This relationship between KE and PE causes some problems 
for the God of process theology, for the amount of kinetic 
energy required to produce actual occasions of perpetually 
increasing complexity is decreasing. As we observe the 
23Issac Asimov, Asimov on Physics (Garden City: 
Doubleday and Co., 1976), p. 130. 
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physical universe, God's consequent nature--his body--we 
realize it is "running down" to eventual heat death.24 
The laws of thermodynamics play an important role in 
defining the relationships between states of energy in the 
relative universe. More specifically, the second_ lavl of 
thermodynamics recognizes that all that exists is 
digressing toward a random state of universal entropy. The 
law holds that: 
A system having specified allowed states and an 
upper bound in volume can reach from any given 
state a stable state and leave no effect on the 
environment.25 
If the universe is finite and closed, then the God of 
process theism, being "in" time, will be subject to all the 
effects of the second law of thermodynamics. 
Given the tendency o:f that vvhich "is" to move toward 
entropy, some interesting ramifications result ~or our 
universe and anything that is in it. Astronomer Paul Davis 
speaks of the fate of the universe when he says: 
There can be few conclusions in science more 
profound than the prediction that the universe is 
doomed, but the predication on which the 
prediction is founded--the second law of 
thermodynamics--is the most fundamental regulator 
of natural activity known to mankind. Its 
application determines the evolution and fate of 
systems as diverse as boxes of gas, sand castles, 
human beings, stars--and the cosmos. The 
inexorable progress towards equilibrium and 
maximum entropy is built into the behavior of 
24Paul Davis, The Runaway Universe (New York: Harper 
and Rowe, 1978), p. 162. 
25aeorge Hatsopouis, and Joseph H. Keenan, Principles 
of Thermodynamics (Ne York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 
P· 373-
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everything; all around us we see the universe 
slowly but surely running down. Unless, 
therefore, our whole understanding of matter and 
energy is misconceived, the inevitability of the 
end of the world is written into the laws of 
nature.26 
At the point where maximum entropy is reached and 
equilibrium is attained, universal heat death will occur 
and motion and activity will cease. 
The realization of ultimate universal heat death leads 
one to ask how God will continue to see his increasingly 
complex lures actualized in a world of absolute entropy. 
As we approach entropy and the end of KE in the universe as 
a system, it will become increasingly difficult for God to 
experience actualized possibilities of perpetually 
increasing complexity. In fact, just the opposite will 
occur, for God will·be unable to stop events from becoming 
perpetually less complex. When the universe approaches 
total entropy, it will be impossible for God to provide 
himself with novel and richer experiences unless, according 
to Asimov, he gives the universal system a "push." Once 
heat death occurs, the process may continue, but there may 
be no novel experiences for God to incorporate into his 
divine memory. At such a point along the spacetime 
continuum, God may look back in fond rememberance of that 
which has occurred, but he may have no hope of ever 
experiencing such complexity in the future. The closer the 
universe moves toward equilibrium, the greater the 
26Davis, The Runaway Universe, p. 159· 
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reduction in the complexity of that which is divinely 
prehended. While it is acknowledged that our knowledge of 
the future is finite and that there may be distant 
actualizations of greater complexities than 1ve currently 
realize, all empirical evidence to date shows this not to 
be the case. Any optimism regarding future increased 
complexity is an exercise of blind faith in light of 
relativity physics and the second law of thermodynamics. 
It may, therefore, be said that God vTill never experience 
greater complexity of occasions than he is experiencing 
right "now. " 
The problem for the process God as he relates to the 
second law of thermodynamics is that he is "in" time. 
Sadly, the God of process thought is trapped in the decay 
of the physical universe. If his physical pole is the 
universe, where could the necessary "push" or burst of 
rejuvenating energy originate? Whitehead states the 
process predicament well when he says: "God is all that he 
could be; he cannot produce effects outside of himself."27 
If our universe is a closed system and God is "in" it, the 
necessary "push" cannot come from the consequent nature of 
God for it is the universe itself. The primordial nature, 
God's mind, has not been shown to be anything more than a 
reservoir for pure possibilities. We must, therefore, 
conclude that the God of process theology is trapped, 
27victor I1owe, 
Johns Hopkins Press, 
Understanding 
1968), p. 157. 
Whitehead (Baltimore: 
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without hope, in a decaying universe--a universe that will 
never achieve greater complexity than there is "right now," 
a universe that will never achieve God's purposes through 
the creative advance. 
Although we have considered some of the ramifications 
of a decaying universe, there are other theories regarding 
the fate of reality that deserve our consideration. Given 
the current expansion of the universe and its relationship 
to the second law of thermodynami,cs, there are but three 
possibilities for the fate of the universal system. The 
first, as previously considered, is that left unaffected 
the universe \-Till slowly expand and succumb to the laws of 
thermodynamics and die. 28 Hm·rever, this concept does not 
allow for the process notion of an endlessly complex 
spacetime continuum. The second pass i bi li ty is that the 
universe will remain in a "steady state" and be perpetually 
injested with new matter. 29 "\'Jhile this theory offers an 
endless universe, it contradicts the process notion of a 
closed universal system. Remember, the process God works 
with that which has been and always will be. The closed 
process universe leaves no room for the perpetual 
introduction of new "stuff." The third possibility is that 
the universe will continue to expand and contract ad 
-, 
infinitum.30 Gruenler addresses this concept when he says: 
28navis, ~he Runaway Universe, p. 197. 
2gn)id. 
30Ibid. 
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Evolutionary advance and entropy can 
reconciled only in a pulsating view of 
universe~ or in an endless sine wave of peaks 
valleys.J1 
be 
the 
and 
At first glance, this concept of an expanding-contracting 
universe appears to offer the possibility of a system that 
may continue to be reorganized from cosmic epoch to cosmic 
epoch. Such a perpetual system would supply God with 
increasingly novel experiences. Thus, the universe may be 
postulated to exist in an endless cycle of expansion and 
contraction. Such a universe would have an endless past 
and a.n endless future. In critiquing such a. notion, Royce 
Gruenler writes: 
While Hartshorne, against Whitehead, argues· that 
new possibilities arise with new actualities, 
nonetheless, with the ebb and flow of finite 
spacetime stuff he cannot consistently argue for 
an infinite number of combinations, although he 
must if he is not going to fall into the logical 
absurdity that if the past extends infinitely 
backward, then,. .we have experienced the 
present and the future, as well as the past, 
endless times before, and every other actuality 
as well. I simply do not know what it means to 
say that the world process of new creativity 
extends infinitely before us, if it extends 
infinitely behind us in actual form.32 
He concludes by saying: 
What cannot be entertained logically in a finite 
universe composed of finite and limited 
components is an infinitely expanding 
configuration that affords everlasting novel 
creativity.33 
Therefore, if the process theologian insists on an 
31 Royce Gordon Grunler, The Inexhaustible God (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983), p. 59-
32Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, p. 111. 
33Ibid., p. 112. 
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expancling-contrac-l:!ing universe in order to preserve the 
perpetuation of the universe, he must give up true novelty 
and freedom. It is clear that that which is experienced 
and will continue to be experienced an infinite number of 
times destroys all hope of novelty. Freedom also becomes 
meaningless, for the choices an actual entity has made he 
will continue to make an infinite number of times--he 
cannot do otherwise. It therefore appears that the God 
of process thought is confined to a universe of decay, a 
universe that is not truly closed, and thus inconsistent 
with the process metaphysic, or a universe without true 
novelty and freedom. 
Although it appears that the process God is confined 
to a universe of decay, all previous discussion presupposed 
the fact that God desires to bring about greater complexity 
in the universe. If, however, God's lures are currently 
being actualized more or less as he intends, then one must 
conclude that God is "willing" the decay of the universe. 
Although certain theologians may like to contend that God's 
( 
initial aim is towarcl greater complexity of experience, all 
empirical evidence per the second law of thermodynamics 
seems to indicate that God is luring less complex events 
into actuality. Such a lure will ultimately result in the 
universal equilibrium of the system and actual occasion of 
ultimate simplicity. The process God then bears the 
ultimate responsibility for the de-evolution of the 
universe or at least our contempt for his apparent 
inability to halt it. 
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In light of the second law of thermodynamics, it must 
be realized that as the universe continues to decay so does 
God's ability to achieve complex experiences. Paul Davis 
writes of total entropy when he says: "The universe \ve 
know will be lost.rr34 He goes on to write: 
What then is our present perspective? Very few 
scientists are prepared to accept the bizarre 
proposition of cosmic time reversal. The steady 
state theory, with its compelling feature of 
end less evolution, has crumbled una er the 
pressure of astronomical observation. The cyclic 
world of death and rebirth is still a spec~lative 
outgrowth of our ignorance about the nature of 
spacetime singularities. The unacceptable truth 
appears to be that the inexorable disintegration 
of the universe as we know it seems assured, the 
organization which sustains all ordered activity, 
from men to galaxies, is slowly ·but inevitably 
running down, and may even be overtaken by a 
total gravitational collapse into oblivion.35 
The question may then be asked: Is God's body, his 
consequent nature, the physical universe, dying? Yes. The 
life of the universe, the kinetic energy necessary to bring 
about increasingly complex actual occasions~ is slowly but 
surely coming to an end. 
34-Davis. Tho RunF~wa:y Un:i.verse, p. 159. 
35Ibid., p. 197. 
Chapter Five 
THE GOD OF THE RRLATIVE UNIVERSE 
It has been contended by process thinkers that if God 
is not "in" time then he cannot be any,vhere 8.t all. 
However, 
esnoused 
after 
by the 
considering 
followers of 
the theologi ca 1 concepts 
process theism, several 
difficulties involving God's ability to exist in time were 
noted. Given our understanding of s imul tanei ty and the 
spacetime continuum, we must conclude that a God who is in 
time may be more philosophically problematic than a God who 
is thought to be "outside" the temporal sphere. For this 
reason, a re-examination of the concepts and ramifications 
of a God outside of time may prove profitable. It is to 
this task that we now direct our efforts. 
Temporality and Eternity 
Even for process theism, more than one mode of 
existence is admitted. The two modes are the temporal and 
the eternal. Clearly, that which is in time involves 
conC'epts of nax:t, presr~nt, and future. "Process theology 
recognizes that all actual occasions are, to some extent, 
temporal for t :h c y are be r; om in g ( fu t u r e ) , are ( present ) , or 
were (past). The relative snacetime continuum is a line on 
which the successive duration of temporal events transpire. 
However, process theism also recognizes the existence of 
the eternal snhere of reality as is evidenced by the mind 
of God and aJl the eternal objects it contains. 
Arthur C. Custance declares that: " .. time and eternity 
!arel different categories of experience."1 It is this 
acknowle~gement of the temnoral and eternal spheres of 
reality which may solve process inconsistencies and allow 
God to work in time without the difficulties inherent with 
actually being "in" time himself. 
As temporal entities, we are mindful of the past and 
anticipate the future. Both of these concepts, the past 
(i.e., that which has already been actualized) and the 
future (i.e., that \vhich will be actualizen), are built 
around some notion of a conscious "present." It must be 
remembered, however, that for temporal entities there can 
be no universal simultaneous present. Given Einstein's 
relativity theories,. one must conclude that there are as 
many presents as there are points of reference. Therefore, 
it would be incorrect to think that there is one single 
point of reference that will allow us to talk about an "at 
once" for the universal system. Although there is no 
temporal simultaneity there is a temnoral "present" for 
each reference frame to which an observer is confined, for 
"every conscious temporal observer has an undeniable, 
i nd i spensab le sense of the absolute present, [the J now." 2 
William James comments about our temporal sense of the 
present when he says: 
1Arthur C. Custance, Time and Eternity (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan Publishing Houset 1977), p. 42. 
2Eleonore Stump, and Norman Kretzmann, "Eterni t:v," in 
Journal of Religion 58, 8 (August 1981): 440. 
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The duration, thus steadily perceived, is hardly 
more than the 'specious present'. Its 
content is iri constant flux, events ~awning into 
its forward end as fast as they fade out of its 
rearward one, and each of them changing its 
time-coefficient from 'not yet,' or 'not quite 
yet,' to 'just gone,' or 'gone' as it passes by. 
Meanwhile, the specious present, the intuited 
duration, stands permanent, •like the rainbow on 
the waterfall, with its own quality unchanged hy 
the events that stream through it.3 
For each temporal entity, then, there is somA concept of a 
"present" corresponding to the entity's personal time 
frame. It is this concept of a present that will provide a 
basis for eternal-temporal interaction. 
Throughout the history of philosophy there has been a 
e,reat debate about 1vhat eternity actually is. Some may 
view eternity as they view numerical infinity. Again, 
Custance considers this relationship when he writes: 
The really important thing to notice is that time 
stands in the same relation to eternity, in one 
sense, as a large number does to infinity. There 
is a sense in which infinity includes a very 
lar~e number, yet it is quite fundamentally 
different and i. ndependent of it. Ann by analogy, 
eternity includes time and yet is fundamentally 
something other. The reduct ion of time until it 
gets smaller and smaller is still not eternity; 
nor do we reach eternity bv an extension of time 4 . ,y 
to grer-tt length. 
What eternity entails is not merely an infinite duration of 
time as implied in the process concept of the divine 
primordial nature. Rather: 
.eternity implies that there is one objective 
reality that contains two modes of existence in 
which two different sorts of duration are 
3vHlliam ,James, 
Editions Prnsn, 1948), 
Psychology 
p. 286. 
(Cleveland: 
4Arthur C. Custance, Time and Eternity, p. 
Fine 
39-
measure<'l 
measure: 
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by hJO irreducibly different 
ti~e and eternity.5 
sorts of 
Our experience as temporal entities of temporal (Juration 
gives us a sense of permanence which is nothing but 
illusion as we examine the nature of time. According to 
Eleonore Stumn and Norman Kretzmann, the existence of a 
typical temporal entity: 
. is spread over years of the past, through 
the present, and into the future; but the past is 
not and the future is not, and the preseqt must 
be understood to be no time at all, a 
durationless instant, a mere point at which the 
past is continuous with the future.6 
Duration, for the temporal entity, does not actually exist. 
If duration does not actually exist for temporal 
entities, genuine duration must, then, be a fully realized 
duration. It must be duration "none of wb ich is gone and 
none of which is yet to come. "7 Therefore, such duration 
must be atempora.l "such that nothing future is absent from 
it and nothing past has flowed a'tlaY. "8 Ari eternal entity 
that experiences true Cluration must exist in a mone of 
atem-porali ty or "outDide" of time. There are no sequence 
of events which make up the duration for there is no past 
and no future, only "presentness."9 This atemporal 
presentness is unlike the temporal present in two ways. 
5stump, and Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 443· 
6Ihid., pp. 444-445. 
7Ibid., p. 4~-5 · 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid. 
Firnt, bec:=mse atemporal presentness involves true 
duration, 
Rather, 
the 
the 
atemporal present 
eternRl present 
past lP-ss, future less, duration. 
is not instantaneous. 
is infinitely extenrted 
Second, a concept of the 
present that is not flanked by pastness or futureness is 
One mRy, therefore, conclude that if non-temporal. 
anything exL.:;ts in t}le eternal present, its existence is 
fully realized, all present at once.10 
If an entity existed in a non-sequential durational 
eternity, the question may then he asked: Is such a being 
really alive since life, as known by temporal entities, is 
a constant sequence of becoming (i.e. learning, growing)? 
Life is generally associated with processes su,ch as those 
espoused by process theism. All such changes denote 
temporality allowing one to infer that an atemporal entity 
cannot be "alive" because life implies processes which, in 
turn, imply temporality. However, vrhat we mean when vTe 
speak of a "being who is exclusively in the mode of eternal 
existence and yet remains alive is a concept of this being 
as "mind. n11 Consinered as aternporal, this beinp;' s mind 
cannot deliberate, plan ahead, or anticipate, for such 
activities involve 
atemporal mind can 
present. 1 2 Although 
a temporal 
be said to 
process. 
"know" in 
Rather, an 
the eternal 
this atemporal being's mind may be 
10stump, and Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 441. 
11 rbid., p. 4M). 
12rrin. 
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disembodied, and thus unable to perceive through normal 
senses, there is nothing about atemporality or incorporeity 
' that would rule out this being's "awareness" of the 
temporal sphere of reality. The notion of an atemporal 
mi-nct is not inherently absurd and neither is the concept of 
a temporal life. It may be reasonably held that a being 
which has a mind, atemporal or temporal, is alive. 
Therefore, an a temporal being with a mind aware of the 
eternal present is alive.13 
Because eternal entities and actual entities exist in 
two separate modes of reality there must be some factor 
common to the experience of both spheres which would allow 
for some interaction. The factor which allows for 
interrelationship between the two spheres is a concept of 
simultaneity of the "present" common to both modes of 
existence. Royce Gruenler refers to this "present" when he 
writes: 
The early Christians were given to see that while 
there is a created temporal sequence for us (as 
temporal creatures] and for the incarnate Christ, 
there is an Absolute Presence that transcends the 
niceties of our human verbal tenses and the 
velocity of light. For us and for God in hiB 
incarnate self-limitation in Christ and in his 
imminent presence in the experience of the 
sparrow. .there is a sequential time and 
relative elsewheres, but not for God in his 
absolute suprapresence. 14 
Thus, God in his absolute suprapresence must share some 
common present with temporal entities. Although there is 
13rtid., p. 447. 
14Rovee Gorr1 on Gruenler, The Inexhaustible Gorl (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983), p. 84. 
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no simultaneity of events in the temporal mode as 
demonstrated by the theories of Einstein, there can he 
simultaneity between the eternal mode and each point of 
reference in the temporal mode if the eternal entity 
exercises suprapresence. Relativity physics poses no 
problem for such an eternal-temporal relationship. The 
actual concept which allows for some form of simultaneity 
betv1een the two modes is that of the "present." The 
temr;oral entity also has a present, for all that "is" is 
encompassed by the past and the future. However, Gruenler 
reminds us that: 
... the future is equally ~resent to God fin his 
atemporal mode of existence I with the present and 
the priSt in his absolute elsewhere. Only in the 
relative and subordinate realm of our redemptive 
history does "future" take on any meaning.15 
Therefore, if vie are going to talk about a basis for an 
eternal-temporal relationship, we must speak of interaction 
at one and the same present rather than one and the same 
time. 1 6 
Because hoth modes of existence share one and the same 
present, an interrelationship is possible. Stump 
and Kretzmann consider this relationship when they write: 
But if anything exists eternally, its existence, 
although infinjtely extenrted, is fully realized, 
all present at on0.e. ThuD the entire life of any 
eternal entity is coexistent with any temporal 
entity at any point at which that temporal entity 
exists. From a temporal standpoint, the present 
is (eternally-temporally) simultaneous with the 
15rbid., p. gg. 
16stump and Kretzmann, "Eternity," pp. 435-436. 
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whole infinite extent of an eternal entity's 
life. From the standpoint of eternity, every 
time is present, co-occ11rrent with the whole of 
infinite aternporal duration.17 
Althoup,h two modes of existence are actual, the realization 
of an eternal-temporal ( E'I') simultaneity provides a common 
present through which the spheres of the eternal and 
temporal ma;v interface. 
As v.re consider the spheres of eternity and 
temporality, we must realize that, although they share the 
saJ11e present, they are two mpdes of very different 
existence. The temporal is actually a durationless instant 
surrounded by T.vhat has been and vrhat will become. True 
duration is to be found in eternity for only in that mode 
does nothing become or transpire, a.ll "is." While 
ET-simultaneity pr.ovides the P. ossibili ty 
- . 
for the 
interaction between these two ~ifferent spheres of reality 
the question still remains: Could an eternal being affect 
that which occurs in the temporal realm? It is to this 
question that we now devote our full consideration. 
The Eternal's Work in Time 
Althoup,h one may acknowledge some concept of a mutual 
present shared by the eternal and temporal spheres, there 
is still the contention that an eternal, atemporal entity 
cannot affect events in the temporal world. Although the 
eternal being may share a simultaneous present with the 
17rbid., p. 441 
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temporal mode, can such a being, in its atemporali ty, 
affect temporal events? Because the eternal and temporal 
spheres are so drastically different, it may be suggested 
that any actual interaction is impossible. While there may 
be reasons for believing that an eternal entity cannot 
affect temporal reality, most stem from misconceptions 
about the nature of the two mo~es of existence. We shall 
subsequently consider three such misconceptions rep:ard ing 
the spheres of eternity and temporality a nil the 
relationship between the two. 
First, it may be contended that an eternal entity, 
confined to the atemporal mode of existence, cannot act in 
the temporal mode because of its drastic difference from 
the eternal realm.18 Stump and Kretzmann offe~ an example 
of such an objection when they say: 
If [an atemporal beingl ... is timeless, he could 
not have procluced an event rat a specific point 
in ti.mej. This v1ould require ... [the being's] 
creative activity. .to have a position in 
time. . but a claim that [an atemporal beingl 
timelessly provided a temporal event is 
absurd. 1 9 
Clearly, whatever is produced or breated atemporally must 
begin to exist at some point in time if it is going to 
effect the temporal mode of reality. The concept of 
producing an effect in time requires some form of action on 
the part of the producer. In this cFtse, it is contende~ 
that an atemporal enti.ty has produced a temporal event and 
18Ibid., p. 447. 
1 ~1 HJid., p. 448. 
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an entity's action is an event in the entity's life. 
However, there can be no temporal event in the life of an 
atemporal entity.20 Therefore, the argument concludes that 
no atemporal entity can act to bring about a temporal 
event. 
Although this argument appears persuasive upon first 
consideration, Eleonore Stump demonstrates the subtle 
confusion inherent in this contention. Stump states that a 
(! istinction must he drawn between: · 1) Acting in such a way 
that the action itself can be located in time, and 2) 
Acting in such a way that the effect can be located in 
time.21 Clearly, 1. is impossible, for an eternal entity's 
life is one extensive "now," thus precluding a temnoral 
action in an atemporal life. However, 2. is not 
inconsistent with an eternal entity's atemporal existence. 
\·le may sRy, therefore, that an a temporal being may wi 11 
something in the eternal mode, and it is not inconsistent 
to think it will have effects in the temporal sphere. For 
example, it may he atemporally willed that Christ rise from 
the dead but the effect was a literal resurrection in 
spacetime history. Although the action (i.e. the 
"1.'lilling") of an atemporR..l being cannot be located along 
the spacetime continuum, the effects of an atemporal action· 
can be. Stump and Kretzmann go on to argue that: 
20rbin. 
21Ibid. 
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Even though fthe eternal entity'sl actions cannot 
be located in time, fthe entityl can bring about 
effects in time unless doing so is logically 
impossible for him.22 
Such an atemporal being can act atemporally but effect the 
temporal present through ET-simultaneity. An eternal 
entity's act ions may thus remain eternal while that which 
results from his actions can be located in temporal 
reality. Although an atemporal being may be considered 
"outside" of time, his desires can still be realized "in" 
time without problems posed by relativity ana temporal 
simultaneity. 
Second, it may be argued that the nature of a temporal, 
action is such that the agent itself must be temporal. In 
other \vords, an act which has its effects in time requires 
an actor who is also in time. Because there are two 
separate modes of existence, an entity in one mode cannot 
act in the other mode unless that entity is part of, or 
"in," that mode of reality. 23 Therefore, if an a temporal 
being becomes exclusively temporal, he encounters all the 
restrictions of relativity physics. 
Stump and Kretzmann consider the problems involved 
1:1hen a temporal effect is claimed to have an atemporal 
origin. Briefly stated, the contended inconsistency is 
that: 1) if a being is eternal, he could not have produced 
temporal effects "yesterday," and 2) the claim that an 
22n>id. 
23stump, and Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 449. 
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a temporal being a temporally produces temporal objects is 
absurd.24 Hmvever, Stump points out that both of these 
propositions are ambiguous because of the scope that can be 
assigned to the terms "yesterday" and "a temporally." She 
would contend that the propositions should be read: 1) If 
a being is atemporal, he cannot yesterday have brought it 
about that a temporal object came into existence, and 2) It 
is absurd to claim that an aternporal being brings it about 
that a temporal object came into existence atemporally.25 
These propositions are true but do not support the position 
that an atemporal being must exist temporally in order to 
produce temporal effects. For example, 
correct because there is no "yesterday" 
proposition 1. is 
in the life of an 
atemporal being. However, such a statement does not 
preclude his effect in time for temporality has 
"yesterdays." Proposition 2. is also correct for no 
temporal object can be brought into being in the sphere of 
atemporali ty. This, however, should not preclude an 
atemporal agent from bringing a temporal object into being 
in the temporal realm per ET-simultaneity. 
The third contention is that "an atemporal entity 
could not preserve anything temporal. .because to do so 
would require temporal duration on the part of the 
preserver."26 Again, if an atemporal being is not in time, 
24rbia. 
25rbio. 
26stump, and Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 448. 
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so the Rreument runs, he cannot preserve or sustain thRt 
which is in time. All that "is" can only be sustained by 
that which is subject to time for that which is "outside" 
of time can have no affect on that which is temporal. 
While Stump and Kretzmann admit that actions and 
effects are not necessarily simultaneous, they contend 
that: 
If we adopt a co-occurrence as a temporally 
justifiable condition on causal connection 
betvreen an action and its effect, we can point 
out that any and every action of an eternal 
entity is ET-simultaneous with any temporal 
effect ascribed to it. And, since it would 
simply beg the question to insist that only 
temporal simultaneity between an action and its 
effect can satisfy this necessary concH tion, we 
see no reason for denying of an eternal, 
omnipotent entity its temporal act of willing 
could bring it about that a temporal object came 
into existence on "yesterday's date."27 
And that: 
If it is not impossible for an omni~otent, 
eternal entity to act in eternity [by atemporally 
willing] in such a way as to bring it about that 
a temporal entity begins to exist at a particular 
time, it is not impossible for an omnipotent 
eternal entity to act in eternity fby atemporally 
-vrilling] in such a way that a temporal entity 
continues to exist during a particular temporal 
interval.28 
Because of the existence of ET-simul tanei ty between the 
eternal and temporal mo~es of reality, that which is 
atemporal is not precluded from sustaining that which 
exists in the temporal mode. 
27Ibid., p. 450. 
2Rrbid. 
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Once the atemporal being has performed a work inside 
the temporal realms, the normal physical processes of 
temporality take over. The atemporal act is thus 
inter-woven with the flow of the spacetime continuum. 
C. S. Lewis addresses the concept when he says:' 
If God annihilates or creates or deflects a unit 
of matter, He has created a new situation at that 
point. Immediately all nature domiciles this new 
situation, makes it at home in her realm, adapts 
all other events to it. It· finds itself 
conforming to all the laws.29 
He goes on to point out that: 
If events ever come in f.rom bevond nature 
altogether f i.e. an a temporal will affects the 
temporal sphere], she will be no more incommoded 
by them. Be sure she will rush to the point 
where she is invaded. . and there hasten to 
accommodA-te the newcomer. The moment it enters 
her realm it obeys her Jaws. . . . The divine 
art of miracle [i.e. the eternal entity affecting 
the temporal realm J is not an art of suspending 
the pattern to which events conform but of 
feeding new events into that pattern.30 
It is not, therefore, inconsistent to contend that the 
atemporal can affect temporal events without violating the 
"laws" of the temporal mode of reality. 
Although one may recognize the existence of two modes 
of reality, the temporal and the eternal, the fact that 
they are separate does not necessarily "()rohi bit atemporal 
actions from having temporal effects. The fact that there 
is a "present" in both modes allows eternal-temporal 
interrelationship to exist. Because of ET-simultaneity, it 
29c. S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: 
c 0. ' 1 94 7) ' p. 60. 
30ibid., p. 61. 
MacMillan Pub. 
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is not incoherent to conceive of an atemporal being acting 
atemporally with temporal effects, remaining in the 
atemporal sphere while bringing about temporal results, and 
sustaining that which is temporal although the sustainer 
remains eternal. An atemporal being can produce temporal 
effects without encountering the difficulties inherent with 
operating in the universe of relativity physics. 
Atemporality: The Process God's Answer 
Many of the problems of process theism revolve around 
the notion of God's being "in" time. The universe is 
thought to be God's physical pole thus allowing God to 
prebend the vrorld as the world prebends God. Process 
thinkers also insist that life must involve a process of 
perpetual becoming and that God is not precluded from this. 
requirement. God, then, is in a constant process of 
"becoming" along with every other created fact and is 
"involved with all creation and temporality. "31 Clearly, 
the process God is subject to change which is a facet of 
temporality. Therefore, God is not exclusively atemporally 
primordial, making him subject to the effects of time 
progression. The God of process theism is not eternal, a 
term denoting aternporality, but rather 
"everlasting" denoting an unbroken succession of temporal 
31Laurence F. Wilmot, vlhitehead and God (Waterloo, 
Ontario: Wilfred Lavrier University, 1979), p. S2. 
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events.32 Perhaps it would be beneficial to con~ider what 
eternity is not. According to Arthur C. Custance: 
The theory of relativity did not strictly concern 
itself with the world in which time was 
nonexistent, but rather with a world in which 
time is relative. The theory of relativity per 
se, therefore, is not concerned with eternity at 
all. There is neither measured nor 
experienced relativity of time in a purely 
spiritual vlOrld~ because time belongs to the 
physical order.3.J 
It is because God is part of the temporal process that 
prohlems vJi th relativity physics and simultaneity 
occur--problems that could be resolved if he were truly 
eternal. 
Because God does have a consequent nature and is 
consideren "in" time, he is subject to the second lavr of 
thermodynamics. As the universe digresses toward ultimate 
entropy, so must God's consequent nature. The problem of 
God's physical ~ecay could be avoided, however, if God were 
an exclusively a temporal entity thus precluding him from 
the effects of temporality. As an a temporal entity, God 
would be in a position to provide the life sustaining 
"push" the universe needs to advance into greater 
complexity. The difficulty \vi th such a. view is that the 
concept of the relationship between God's physical and 
mental poles 
32John B. 
(Philadelphia: 
provides the basis for the process 
Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology 
Westminster Press, 1974), pp. 162, 181. 
33Arthur C. Custance, Time and Eternity, p. 38. 
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metaphysic.34 Although God's atemporali ty would resolve 
many of process theism's problems with temporality and 
relativity theories, God cannot be removed from physical 
reality for his physical pole is conceived to be all that 
II iS • II Therefore, the God of process theism is doomed to 
suffer the consequences of the second law of 
thermodynamics. 
Also previously considered were the problems of 
polytheism when Goo iR thought of as a society of actual 
occasions. Because there are as many temporal reference 
frames as there are points of . reference, and thus a 
multiplicity of contemporaneous actual occasions, we cannot 
speak of God as a single, universal AO. There are myrians 
of transpiring actual occasions and no basis, aside from 
"blind faith", for believing they are all part of one 
organism. 
Again, this problem could be resolved if the process 
God could be cons ide red to be a temporal. If God were 
eternal, all events which comprise his existence could he 
considered to be simultaneous--one eternal "now." As long 
as the process God is forced to bear the effects of 
relative temporality there can be no simultaneity of 
experience that would allov.r God to be called "the universal 
actual occasion." 
A problem also arises when we remember that God cannot 
supply uniform pure possibilities for the universe as a 
34 Alan Gragg, Charles Hartshorne (Waco: 
1 973) ' pp. 82-q1 . 
Word Books, 
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system. Becatl.se spacetime does not progress at a uniform 
rate throughout the universe, God must supply each actual 
occasion with a lure as it is actualized disjunctive from 
every other AO. The process God cannot provide a IJUre 
possibility for the entire universal system because the 
entire system is not simultaneously actualized. God cannot 
be said to effectively lure the entire system as a unit. 
However, if God were atemporal he could be 
ET-Pimultaneous with every point of reference and thus 
every event 
process God 
in the universe, as it 
would then be able to 
is actualized. 
effectively lure 
The 
the 
universe as a unit although each temporal event is 
non-simultaneously actualized. The ET-s imul taneous 
relationship between the temporal and eternal modes would 
allow God to effectively lure the physical universe as a 
system while leaving the concepts of relativity physics in 
tact. 
Not only did we previously conclude that God could not 
effectively lure the universe as a system, we also 
determined that his lures can never result in ultimate 
good. Because there is no simultaneity in the temporal 
universe, God can never know when one portion of the 
universe will reach ultimate good before the others. 
Once again, if God I'Tere atemporal he could properly 
coordinate the advance of the universe and would know when 
the universe, as a unit, reaches ultimate good (even if it 
is only for that specific cosmic epoch) because he wouJ.d be 
ET-simlltanAous with every point of reference in the 
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system. As an eternal entity, God could coordinate the 
universal advance and realize when the system reached some 
state of ultimate good without violating the concepts of 
relative temporality. 
After considering the ramifications of a God "outside" 
of time, one must recognize that such a concept offers a 
resolution to many of the problems raised by notions of a 
deity "in" time. An exclusively eternal process God would 
overcome the effects of temporal decay, could be considered 
"one" instead of the disjunctive "many," could provide 
effective lures and a greater degree of control to the 
universal system, and could realize some ultimate good for 
each cosmic epoch. The choice, th~n, is between making God 
exclusively atemporal, and thus make God inconsistent with 
the process metaphysic, or leave God "in" time rendering 
him inconsistent with relative temporality. Clearly, each 
choice is unacceptable prompting one to reconsider the 
merits of the theological concepts of classical theism and 
its eternal God. 
The Eternal God 
The God who is needed to control all relative spaces 
and times must be a being who is outside of temporality. 
Such a God cannot be the God of process theism for such an 
atemporal being would contradict the metaphysic upon which 
the theology rests. The divine characteristic of immutable 
attributes is implied in atemporality which would 
completely contradict the process concept of a God who is 
' 
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perpetually "growing." Such a requirement for divlne 
atemporality~ in light of relativ~ time theories, calls for 
a re-evaluation of the attributes of the eternal God of 
classical theism--a God who can affect the temporal sphere 
without being adversely affected by it. 
JJet us first turn our attention to God's atemporal 
omniscience or knowledge of the past, present, and future. 
The process theist would contend that the future cannot be 
known because it is contingent on the prehensions of actual 
occasions ann is not yet actual. The God of classical 
theism may also be held to be unknowledgeable of contingent 
future events, not because God is limited in his knowledge 
but because there is no "future" events to an eternal 
being--all is present. Every temporal event is 
ET-simul taneous vJi th God's present state of awareness--God 
cannot atemporally foreknow anything.35 Rather, such an 
entity knows all temporal events: 
.including those which are future with 
respect to our current temporal view point; but 
because the times at vlhich those future events 
will be present events are ET-simul taneous with 
the whole of eternity, an omniscient eternal 
entity is aware of them as they are present.36 
Stump further illustrates this concept: 
For us the future is not yet actual. But God's 
eternal present is simultaneorts with our temporal 
present and vri th the future when the future is 
actual. And therefore the future is of course 
not present to us, it is present to God. Think 
of a line on a paper in front of you and imagine 
35stump, and Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 436. 
36rbid., pp. 453-454· 
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four points on the line: A, B, C, D--in that 
order. Imagine that these points are [perceiving 
entitiesl although two-dimensional. Then A will 
perceive B but not C, and B wil perceive A and C 
but not D, and so on. It will seem to these 
creatures a la1t1 of the universe that one can 
perceive no more than a point on either side of 
one. You, however, being in a richer mode of 
existence, can perceive all these points at once; 
Bnd nothing in your ability to do so undermines 
the reality or the ordering of the points, 
although your mode of existence and cogn it i,on may 
be almost unthinkable to them. Something along 
these lines seems to me to be 
analogous--imperfect no doubt--in space to the 
state of God's existence and knowledge with 
regard to temporal creatures in time.37 
God, then, can be said to be omniscient for all which was, 
is, and is to come, is in his eternal present. 
The question may then be asked: If all that is 
temporally past, present, and future, is eternally present, 
can God know what time it is? According to Kretzmann and 
Stump, yes. Does an atemporal God know what is actually 
happening inside temporal reality? Again, yes, for: 
The whole of eternity is ET-simultaneous with 
each temporal event as it is actually happening; 
the only way in which an eternal entity can be 
aware o:f any temporal event is to be aware of it 
as it is actually happening.38 
Therefore, God can be said to be outside of temporality, 
kno~ all temporal events as present, and still be able to 
know the temporal present as it actually occurs. Even if 
relative temporality is operational, God knows all temporal 
events simultaneously with their occurrence, regardless of 
the event's relative time frame. 
37E1eonore Stump, A personal letter regarding eternity. 
and temporality, 18 April 1984. 
38stump and Kretzr1ann, "Eternjty," p. 457. 
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Because atemporal duration is "none of which is absent 
or flowed away," God must be considered omniscient. Unlike 
process theism, classical theism's eternal God is not one 
who is growing, learning, and becoming, but is, rather, the 
"I Am"--self existent, immutable being. God's name "I Am": 
... is not a description of God but simply a 
declaration of His self-existence, and His 
eternal changelessness; a reminder to mankind 
that He is life Himself, and that what He is now, 
He is eternally.39 
Therefore: 
The first and fundamental difference between the 
Creator and the creatures is that they are 
mutable and their natures admit change, whereas 
God is immutable and can never cease to be what 
He is.40 
The atemporal God of classical theism is not subject to the 
adverse effects of relative temporality but remains 
complete in his knowlenge and character "outside" the 
sphere of time. 
One last issue to consider is whether the atemporal 
God of classical theism can operate within the realms of 
relative temporality. Because God is ET-simultaneous with 
every event that is actual, there is no difficulty 
understanding how God COlllcl locate physical objects along 
the relative spacetime continuum. God could, for example, 
locate and direct a star "in" the relative spacetime 
continuum to be a guicle for the \visemen as they traveled to 
39J. I. Packer, Knowing God (Downers Grove: Inter 
Varsity Press, 1973), p. 69. 
40ibid., p. 67. 
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see the Messiah. It is possible for an eternal God to 
locate and coordinate physical objects in a relative 
reference frrtme. It is only when God is outside of time 
that he has the ability to act and direct physical objects 
inside the sphere of relative temporality. 
Although God can direct physical matter in 
temporality, must God's actions always conform to the 
theories of relativity? If, for example, the classical God 
atemporally willed that a physical object be accelerated 
past the speed of light could it be done? According to 
Einstein, such an acceleration could not occur given the 
velocity restrictions placed upon physical matter. Does 
this mean that the laws of the relative universe are 
superior to the will of the eterndl God? The answer is no. 
According to I,ewis, there are three concepts of the 
laws of nature in their relationship to temporal-eternal 
interaction. The first posit ion considers the laws to be 
brute facts.41 We know nature behaves this way or that but 
cannot say why. However, this concept gives no assurance 
against the miraculous for there is no assurance that 
natural laws will be obeyed tomorrow. According to Lewis, 
if we don't know why something has happened, there is no 
reason to believe that it could not be otherwise, and 
therefore, " .have no certainty that it might not 
someday be otherwise."42 
41 I · JeWlS, Hiracles, p. 56. 
42Ibid., p. 57. 
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Another possibility is that the laws of nature are 
merely an application of the laws of averages. 43 Under 
this position, the events of nature are thought to be 
random ann lawless but the average behavior of the 
occasions can be determined. However, expect at ions based 
on the laws of averages work only if temporal natural 
events remain undoctored by a Goo willing in the eternal 
realm.44 The question of whether the temporal laws of 
nature are affected by the eternal realm is just the 
question of whether nature is being doctored. Such a 
position begs the question. 
The third view, contends Lewis, is somewhat more 
complex for it states that the laws of nature are necessary 
truths.45 The laws merely hold that "· .every event is 
itself and not something different. n46 However, if you 
recognize the existence of a temporal, physical law, such a 
recognition allows you to more easily determine when the 
supernatural occurs. According to Lewis: 
... no one knows better than a scientist that AB 
cannot yield the same result as A. The 
necessary truth of the laws, far from making it 
impossible that miracles r the operation of the 
eternal in the temporal realm] should occur makes 
it certain that if the supernatural is operating 
they must occur. For if the natural situation by 
itself, and the natural situation plus something 
else, yielded the same result, it would then be 
44Ibid., p. 58. 
45Ibic1., p. 57. 
46Ibid. 
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that we should be faced with a lawless and 
unsystematic universe.47 
It must be understood that the laws of nature do not cause 
events to transpire. They merely describe the way past 
events have occurred. C. S. Lewis says: 
Thus in one sense the laws of nature cover the 
whole field of space and time; in another what 
they leave out is precisely the whole real 
universe--the incessant torrent of actual events 
which make up true history. That must come from 
somewhere else.48 
It must be realized that the la.\vs of nature are not actual 
laws that cannot be broken. Rather, they are merely 
descriptions of relationships within the temporal universe. 
C. S. Lewis speaks of this relationship when he says: 
It is, therefore, inaccurate to define a rni racle 
[i.e. the acceleration of a physical object 
beyond the velocity of light in apparent 
violation of relativity concepts l as something 
that breaks the laws of nature. It doesn't.49 
He goes on to add that: 
In the forward direction (i.e. during the time 
which follows [the miracles' l occurrence) it is 
interlocked vri th all nature just like any other 
event. Its peculiarity is that it is not in that 
way interlocked backwards, interlocked with the 
previous history of nature.50 
Nature's laws are not "broken." Physical relationships are 
merely changed in relation to those which have previously 
been observed. The omnipotent God of classical theism 
47Lewis, Miracles, PP· 59-60. 
48Ibid., P· 60. 
49Ibid., p. 60. 
50Ibid., P· 61 . 
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should be able to re-define these physical relationships as 
he wills. 
It is clear, then, that what is required is a God 
above time and this is exactly what the theology of 
classical theism offers. Royce Gruenler writes: 
Only the God who is above spacetime as its 
creator and sustainer who reveals himself to the 
mind of finite human beings can make it possible 
for them to comprehend him at all, and then only 
in explorable paradoxes having to do with the 
mystery of his being and time.5T 
While God is above time he is still active in the temporal 
world as he proceeds with his redemptive plan. Gruenler 
goes on to say that: 
.biblical revelation does so much more than 
metaphysical speculation by announcing that the 
God beyond time has taken on time redemptively in 
Jesus Christ. Hence the preferred perspective of 
time--God Is time for us--is the karios of the 
cross. In the biblical process of redemption 
there is a past, present, and a future that is 
couched in terms of recitation, prophecy, and 
eschatology.52 
The event of Christ's incarnation, his death, burial, and 
resurrection, provide temporal entities with the historical 
evidence necessary to establish the existence and 
credibility of the eternal God of Christian theism. The 
eternal, omnipotent, omniscient God of classical theism is 
the God of the physical universe and the relative temporal 
relationships which compose it. 
51Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God, p. 99. 
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Conelusion 
After cons i.der i ng the concepts of eternity, 
simultaneity, anrl relative temporality, we find that an 
atemporal deity is nee~ed to coordinate the complexities of 
relative space and time. Although many of process theism's 
problematic positions could be resolved by adopting a 
concept of exclusive divine atemporality, such an adoption 
would contradict its basic metaphysical framework. The 
process God must be left "in" time to maintain metaphysical 
consistency but such a position contradicts Einstein's 
theories. Such a position of inherent inconsistency 
renders process theism intellectually unacceptable. It is 
time for process theologians to acknowledge these 
inconsistencies, abandon the metaphysic, and return to the 
eternal God of classical Christian theism. 
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